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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Newsperson's
Privilege-The First Amendment Guarantee of a
Free Press Protects Against Compelled Disclosure
of a Journalist's Exercise of Editorial Control and
Judgment
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff, a former army officer who had achieved national
prominence by claiming that his superiors ignored his reports of
atrocities by American forces in Vietnam,' brought a libel suit
against defendant television producer, reporter, and network for
broadcasting a program that cast doubt upon plaintiff's allegations.2
Contending that defendant did not present available information
corroborating plaintiff's claims,3 plaintiff sought discovery4 of the
producer's beliefs, opinions, intent, and conclusions in preparing
1. Colonel Anthony Herbert had formally charged his superior officers, Brigadier Gen-
eral John W. Barnes and Colonel J. Ross Franklin, with covering up war crimes that he had
reported to them in Vietnam. When Herbert subsequently was relieved of his command,
various magazine articles and television appearances generated interest in Herbert's story.
The Army investigated Herbert's charges of war crimes and exonerated General Barnes in
October 1971. In this period of intense public interest, Herbert announced his retirement from
the service, citing incessant harassment by the military because of his disclosures.
2. Barry Lando, then an associate producer of the CBS "Weekend News," had produced
a laudatory report on Herbert. When Lando became a producer for CBS's "60 Minutes" a
year later, he decided to produce a comprehensive report on the Herbert controversy. Lando
focused on particular allegations, conducting many interviews with people who could corro-
borate Herbert's claims. During the production period Lando received an uncorrected proof
of Soldier, a book written by Herbert in collaboration with James Wooten of the New York
Times. Lando found that several of those interviewed denied that certain incidents reported
in the book had occurred, while others verified many of Herbert's reports. Lando's research
culminated in the telecast of "The Selling of Colonel Herbert" on February 4, 1973. The
telecast looked in detail at several aspects of Herbert's claims, presenting interviews and
evidence that revealed many inconsistencies and contradictions in Herbert's allegations.
Herbert responded to the CBS broadcast by instituting a defamation action alleging
$44,725,000 in damages for injury to his reputation and impairment of his book Soldier as a
literary property.
3. Although the broadcast alluded to information corroborating Herbert's claims, it
clearly raised serious doubts about Herbert's allegations.
4. Rule 37(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a discovering party to
apply for an order compelling discovery upon reasonable notice to the other party. If the
deponent fails to answer a submitted question, the discovering party may move for an order
compelling an answer. A motion under rule 37(a) implements the provisions of rule 26(b)(1),
which allows parties to obtain discovery of any nonprivileged matter relevant to the pending
action and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
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the program.5 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected defendant's contention that the first
amendment protected the editorial process8 and ruled that plain-
tiff's discovery of defendant's state of mind should be broad and
unrestricted.' On interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, reversed. In a libel action
brought by a public figure, the first amendment guarantee of a free
press protects against compelled disclosure of a journalist's exercise
of editorial control and judgment. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978)
(No. 77-1105).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Defamation
At common law a defamation action was designed to protect an
individual's interest in reputation. A publisher, broadcaster, or
speaker could be held strictly liable for the publication or utterance
of a defamatory falsehood.9 If a plaintiff proved that a defamatory
5. Herbert contended that Lando deliberately distorted the presentation of the facts by
selective investigation, skillful editing, and one-sided interviewing, which created the impres-
sion that Herbert had been evasive in the interview. During discovery CBS turned over
outtakes and notes to Herbert, choosing to assert an editorial privilege only for the intellectual
decision of what materials to broadcast. Although the parties had cooperated throughout the
discovery process, Lando refused to answer questions about his beliefs, opinions, intent, and
conclusions in preparing the program. The objectionable inquiries pertained to Lando's con-
clusions concerning which leads he would pursue, his beliefs concerning the veracity of inter-
viewees or facts imparted by them, his reasons for omitting certain information, and his
conversations about matter to be included in the broadcast.
6. Lando, Mike Wallace (the correspondent for the program), and CBS maintained that
the broadcast represented a fair and accurate account of public proceedings, reported in good
faith and without malice. In addition, CBS claimed that the first amendment barred any
inquiry into the editorial process used in producing the report.
7. The district court reasoned that a public figure (Herbert's status as a public figure
was not contested) who must carry the heavy burden of proving that an alleged libeler acted
with actual malice or in reckless disregard of the truth was entitled to a liberal interpretation
of the rules on pretrial discovery.
8. Several justifications were offered for strict liability in defamation. The primary
justification arose from the recognition that defamation was difficult to prove, and a strict
liability standard improved the chances that fair and adequate compensation would be
awarded. Strict liability also gave the plaintiff an opportunity to vindicate his reputation in
an appropriate public forum. Further, strict liability was viewed as an appropriate mecha-
nism for insuring that public statements would reflect the truth. Finally, strict liability as to
the mass media was advocated to penalize negligence and to implement the "enterprise
liability" theory for those defamation judgments that did occur. See Eaton, The American
Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,
61 VA. L. Rav. 1349, 1357-59 (1975).
9. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 113 (4th ed. 1971).
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statement0 was communicated to a third person, the defendant was
liable unless he could demonstrate that the publication was true or
was privileged." To protect freedom of expression, the common law
recognized limited privileges to defeat asserted reputational inter-
ests. An absolute privilege existed when the need for complete free-
dom of expression outweighed the state's interest in providing a
remedy for reputational injury.' 2 In addition, the courts developed
two qualified privileges for the benefit of the media. The "fair com-
ment" privilege protected statements of opinion, criticism, and
comment, but did not extend to false assertions of fact.'3 The
"reporter's privilege" allowed the press to report accurately on offi-
cial or public proceedings.' 4
In the 1964 decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'5 the
Supreme Court dramatically changed the common law by ruling
that constitutional principles applied to defamation actions.' The
10. A defamatory statement was defined as one that "tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
11. Truth was a complete defense at common law. The law presumed, however, that
the alleged defamation was false, leaving the burden of proving the truth of the statement
on the defendant. The courts required detailed proof indicating the veracity of an alleged
defamation. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 116.
12. The absolute privileges were limited to protecting defamatory statements made in
judicial and legislative proceedings, executive communications, communications between a
husband and wife, situations in which the plaintiff had consented to the defamatory publica-
tion, and political broadcasts requiring equal opportunity to all political candidates. See
PROSSER, supra note 9, § 114.
13. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 201 n.17 (1976). One problem created by the "fair comment"
privilege was the difficulty encountered by courts in distinguishing between facts and opin-
ion. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dispute in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962). The minority view protected even false statements
of fact "if they were made for the public benefit with an honest belief in their truth, because
the public interest demanded that those who are in a position to furnish information about
public servants be not deterred by fear of suit, with the resulting necessity of proving the truth
of what they say in court." PROSSER, supra note 9, at 820.
14. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 115.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. On March 29, 1960, the New York Times published a full page advertisement that
included an account of alleged actions taken by police against black demonstrators. Montgo-
mery City Commissioner L.B. Sullivan was an elected public official responsible for supervis-
ing the police department. Although not named in the advertisement, Sullivan claimed to
have been defamed as supervisor of the police department by two factual errors in the
publication. The factual errors were relatively trivial, but Alabama law did not recognize a
privilege for good faith misstatement of fact in discussion of public issues, and it limited the
"fair comment" privilege to opinion. The issue at trial boiled down to the truth of the
advertisement's allegations. The jury determined that the New York Times had failed to
demonstrate the truth of the allegations and awarded Sullivan $500,000, a decision which the
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 376 U.S. at 256-64; see Kalven, The New York Times
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Court held that the first amendment protected defamatory false-
hoods published by a defendant about a public official if the state-
ments were not made with "actual malice"' 7 or in reckless disregard
of the truth. The Court recognized the inherent tension between
society's interest in protecting an individual's reputation and the
national commitment to first amendment values.'" Reasoning that
the threat of constant litigation would inhibit the reporting of infor-
mation about public officials,' 9 the Court concluded that a constitu-
tional privilege was necessary to protect uninhibited public debate
and to alleviate the pressure on the media to exercise self-
censorship."0 The majority opinion, however, did not define the
exact scope of the privilege. Justices Black and Douglas in a concur-
ring opinion asserted that the first amendment provided an absolute
immunity to all defamation actions.2'
In Garrison v. Louisiana12 the Court began to clarify the New
York Times actual malice standard by emphasizing that only those
false statements made with a high degree of awareness of their prob-
able falsity23 would be sufficient to meet the actual malice standard.
The Court in St. Amant v. Thompson24 ruled that actual malice
requires proof that the defendant "entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication."2 This requirement presents the plain-
tiff with the difficult task of affirmatively producing evidence of
defendant's knowing state of mind, but removes motive or a desire
to injure from the court's consideration.28 Thus, under Garrison and
St. Amant, the Court interpreted the New York Times standard to
require the plaintiff to produce affirmative evidence of the defen-
dant's subjective state of mind from which a jury might infer actual
Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191;
Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L.
REV. 315 (1965).
17. Professor Prosser asserted that the term "malice" had been used in so many differ-
ent contexts that it was an unfortunate word for the Court to employ in describing the
defamation standard. It is used by the Court to describe a statement published with knowl-
edge of its falsity. Paossa, supra note 9, § 118
18. 376 U.S. at 270-73.
19. Id. at 282-83.
20. Id. at 270; see Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422
(1975); Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press Power,
54 TEx. L. REV. 271 (1976); Robertson, supra note 13.
21. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
22. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
23. Id. at 74.
24. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
25. Id. at 731.
26. See Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing
Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 782-83 (1975).
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malice or reckless disregard of the truth. In Goldwater v. Ginzburg,27
the Second Circuit liberally interpreted the New York Times stan-
dard in holding that proof of bad motive or failure to investigate
could be cumulatively used to establish by appropriate inferences
the fact of a defendant's recklessness or of his knowledge of falsity.,
The Court also sought to determine the classes of people or
events that entitled the press to invoke the first amendment privi-
lege. Rosenblatt v. Baer,29 an action by the supervisor of a county-
operated recreation area, extended the public official concept to
include public employees who have or appear to have substantial
responsibility for governmental affairs.30 In Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 31 the Court recognized that the values supporting uninhibited
discussion of public matters must be weighed against society's inter-
est in preventing attacks on an individual's reputation. 32 In making
this balance, the Court allowed recovery by a "public figure" be-
cause it found an extreme departure from acceptable standards of
investigation normally adhered to by responsible publishers. 3 3 More
importantly, Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion proposed
expansion of the New York Times public official concept to include
"public figures" because they often are influential in ordering so-
ciety3 and have ready access to the mass media, allowing them to
influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activi-
ties.3 5 Indicating its deference to first amendment values, the plural-
ity opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,31 held that any per-
son involved in matters of public or general concern must prove
actual malice to recover in a defamation action.3 7 In dissent, Justice
Harlan stated that the Court was undervaluing the reputational
27. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
28. 414 F.2d at 342.
29. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
30. The supervisor of a county-operated recreation area brought suit, claiming that the
New York Times standard was not applicable to him because he was not a public official.
31. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). An article published by defendant Saturday Evening Post
charged that plaintiff, the head football coach at the University of Georgia, had fixed a
football game. The Court held plaintiff was a "public figure" and had to meet the New York
Times standard of proof in order to be awarded damages.
32. Id. at 147.
33. Id. at 155.
34. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
35. Id. For a discussion of this ready access argument, see Barron, Access-The Only
Choice for the Media?, 48 TEx. L. REv. 766 (1970).
36. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Defendant radio station broadcast news stories of plaintiff's
arrest for possession of obscene literature and also reported on plaintiff's lawsuit against city
and police officials alleging that the magazines he distributed were not obscene. These latter
stories did not mention plaintiff's name, but referred to him in less than flattering terms.
37. Id. at 44.
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interest and argued that publishers should be required to investi-
gate statements carefully before publication2 Reasoning that a pri-
vate person should be afforded greater protection because he has
more limited access to the media than a public figure, 39 Justice
Harlan advocated a negligence standard of liability for defamation
of private persons by the media. The Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 40 adopted Justice Harlan's reasoning, and held that the
constitutional privilege established in New York Times extended
only to defamatory falsehoods about public officials and public fig-
ures. The Court recognized the legitimate state interest in protect-
ing an individual's reputational interests by allowing the states to
determine the standard of care imposed upon the media for defama-
tory statements about private individuals." The Gertz Court also
limited recovery of damages to the amount of the actual injury
unless liability was based upon a knowing falsity. 2 For public offi-
cials and public figures, New York Times and its progeny estab-
lished the constitutional rule that a plaintiff must demonstrate that
a false statement was knowingly made or was made in reckless
disregard of the truth to recover against a media defendant.
B. The Newsperson's Privilege
The press has maintained that its right to acquire, edit, and
disseminate the news is protected by the first amendment in order
to assure the continued vitality of the press. A constitutional privi-
lege has long existed for the unrestrained dissemination of the news
by the press. In Near v. Minnesota," the Court viewed prior re-
straints on the press as constitutionally impermissible even if the
suppressed information was libelous and emphasized the public's
need for a vigorous press to expose governmental corruption." In
38. Id. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 66-72.
40. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The plaintiff was an attorney representing the family of a youth
who had been unlawfully shot by a police officer. The defendant magazine, American
Opinion, published an article identifying plaintiff as the architect of a nationwide Communist
conspiracy to undermine law enforcement agencies. The article contained false statements
about plaintiff's membership in certain Communist organizations and his criminal record.
41. Id. at 341-47. The Court gave the states the right to define liability standards for
defamatory statements injurious to the individual, provided that they do not impose liability
without fault. See 29 VAND. L. REv. 1431 (1976).
42. 418 U.S. at 349.
43. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The Court invalidated a Minnesota statute that allowed the
state to enjoin the publication of newspapers containing defamatory matter.
44. Id. at 719-20.
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Grosjean v. American Press Co.,45 the Court held that a Louisiana
newspaper tax graduated to reflect circulation levels jeopardized the
free flow of information. The Court recently reaffirmed the constitu-
tional prohibition against prior restraints in Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart," advising judges to investigate carefully alternative
methods for minimizing the effect of pretrial publicity before impos-
ing gag orders on the press. The Court's decisions reflect a willing-
ness to scrutinize the burdens imposed upon the distribution pro-
cess by statutes or rulings even if such burdens only indirectly affect
first amendment values.
Commentators have argued that the press must have the right
to acquire information in order to exercise effectively its right to
distribute the news. 47 This logical precedent has led the courts to
consider a qualified constitutional newsperson's privilege. The con-
stitutional claim to a newsperson's testimonial privilege is of recent
origin. Because the common law viewed the duty to testify as some-
thing owed by all persons in the community, common-law courts
repeatedly rejected claims to a newsperson's privilege based upon
ethical considerations and economic hardship.48 In Garland v.
Torre," the first case to consider whether news sources must remain
confidential to assure the free flow of information guaranteed by the
first amendment, 5 the Second Circuit held that the fair administra-
tion of justice is a paramount public interest that impinges upon the
45. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
46. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
47. See Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71
COLuM. L. REv. 838 (1971).
48. Reporters argued that to reveal sources would impinge upon the ethical standards
of their profession and would endanger their economic survival by disrupting the confidential
relationships upon which the trade often depends. Both of these rationales for a newsperson's
privilege were rejected by courts because of the priority given to legal considerations.
Common-law courts, however, have shown some understanding of the newsperson's delicate
position either by refusing to compel testimony from a newsperson when it was of doubtful
relevance to the pending action or by minimizing the penalties for contempt charges made
against a reluctant reporter. For a more thorough discussion of the common law history of
the newsperson's privilege, see Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg v.
Hayes: Whither Now?, 64 J. CraM. L. & CraM. 218, 225-27 (1973).
49. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958). Defendant columnist attributed several statements that
were alleged to be false and highly damaging to plaintiff's career to an unidentified CBS
network executive. When Garland brought a defamation action, Torre refused to divulge the
name of the CBS executive and was held in criminal contempt by the court. Id. at 547.
50. See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 47; Note, The Newsman's Privilege: Government
Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970).
See generally Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229
(1971).
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freedom of the press.5'
The Supreme Court considered the newsperson's testimonial
privilege in Branz burg v. Hayes.2 Although the Court acknowledged
that news gathering qualified for some first amendment protection,
it emphasized that the first amendment did not invalidate every
incidental burden on the press caused by the application of general
laws.5 3 Thus, Justice White's plurality opinion rejected a constitu-
tional immunity from grand jury subpoenas for newspersons, hold-
ing that newspersons must appear before grand juries and answer
all relevant questions concerning criminal investigations. 4 Justice
Stewart's dissent, adopted by two other Justices, advocated a quali-
fied newsperson's privilege that would protect the reporter from
appearing before a grand jury unless the government could demon-
strate the following: (1) probable cause to believe that the reporter
had information clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; (2) the information could not be obtained by means less de-
structive of first amendment rights; and (3) a compelling interest
in the information.5 Justice Douglas's dissent argued that the first
amendment required an absolute privilege protecting newspersons
from revealing their sources.5 1 Justice Powell, exercising the pivotal
vote, wrote a concurring opinion that stressed the limited nature of
the Court's holding.57 Endorsing a qualified privilege, Justice Powell
proposed a case-by-case balancing "between freedom of the press
51. 259 F.2d at 549.
52. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court consolidated for review four cases concerning a
newsperson's qualified privilege to withhold grand jury testimony. Paul Branzburg wrote a
story for the Louisville Courier-Journal about the making of hashish, which caused him to
be subpoenaed by two separate grand juries. In the first case (Branzburg I), he refused to
say whom he had observed making the hashish; in the second case (Branzburg II), he refused
to divulge the names of informers who had told him where the drugs were being used. Earl
Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, had interviewed a Black Panther leader who
expressed an intention to kill President Nixon. Caldwell had refused to appear before a grand
jury or to turn over his notes and recordings relating to the interview. Paul Pappas, a reporter
for a Providence, Rhode Island, television station, had been invited inside a Black Panther
headquarters to witness an anticipated raid that never occurred. Pappas testified about what
he had seen outside the Panther headquarters before a grand jury, but not about what he
had observed inside. See Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege
for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 710-13 (1975).
53. 408 U.S. at 682-83; see Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1974); Note, supra note 47.
54. 408 U.S. at 690-91.
55. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas stated, "His [reporter's] immunity in
my view is therefore quite complete, for, absent his involvement in a crime, the First Amend-
ment protects him against an appearance before a grand jury and if he is involved in a crime,
the Fifth Amendment stands as a barrier." Id.
57. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct."5 Thus, the Branzburg opinions indi-
cated that a qualified newsperson's privilege exists, but failed to
define the scope of the privilege. s9 In Baker v. F & F Investment,6
the Second Circuit, attempting to apply Branzburg, held that the
public interest in receiving information from confidential inform-
ants can outweigh the public and private interest in compelled testi-
mony.' In Carey v. Hume,62 another Second Circuit decision since
Branzburg, the court did order disclosure of a confidential source,
but only because the allegedly libelous statement was based entirely
on confidential sources, and the plaintiff had no way of proving the
case without knowing the identity of those sources. 3
The newsperson's constitutional protections for acquiring and
disseminating information inevitably led to the Court's recognition
that the editorial process also required safeguards. In Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee64 the
Court held that the first amendment did not require the media to
accept paid political advertisements, ruling that the first amend-
ment implicitly protects the journalist's discretionary choice of ma-
terial. 5 Subsequently, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,65
the Court unanimously invalidated a state law compelling newspa-
pers to accept editorial replies, reasoning that the law interfered
with the editor's judgment of what constituted newsworthy mate-
rial.67 CBS and Tornillo highlight the Court's concern for govern-
mental intrusions upon the editing process. Emphasizing the need
for a vigorous and responsible press, the Court has authorized sub-
stantial protections against any encroachments upon the media's
58. Id. at 710; see Goodale, supra note 52, at 716-19. Goodale suggests that Powell has
in effect adopted Stewart's tripartite test of (1) relevance; (2) exhaustion of alternative
sources; and (3) compelling national interest in the testimony.
59. Several courts have considered the qualified privilege since Branzburg, and they
generally have recognized a first amendment privilege both to gather and edit the news. See
Goodale, Subpoenas, in PRACTiSING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMUNICATIONs LAW 221-46 (1977).
60. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
61. Id. at 782.
62. 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
63. 492 F.2d at 637-39. A concurring opinion indicated that the immense power of the
modern media required reporters to divulge sources in a civil libel suit. Id. at 639-40 (MacKin-
non, J., concurring).
64. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
65. Id. at 126-30.
66. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
67. See generally Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L.J. 361 (1976); Note,
Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 563 (1976).
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news-gathering, editing, or distribution functions, but has failed to
delineate the full scope of these protections.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
Initially recognizing that the free flow of information depends
upon the uninhibited acquisition, processing, and dissemination of
information, the instant court held that the first amendment guar-
antee of a free press protects against disclosure of the editorial pro-
cess. Asserting that Branzburg recognized the right of the press to
acquire information and a testimonial privilege for reporters," the
court noted that prior restraints encouraging anticipatory censor-
ship were constitutionally impermissible. The court also observed
that the Supreme Court had given specific protections to the edi-
torial process in CBS and Tornillo.69 The court recognized that in-
quiries into defendant's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions while
preparing a report endangered "the heart of the vital human compo-
nent of the editorial process."70 Reasoning that inquiries into the
editorial process would chill candid discussion in the newsroom and
encourage the media to avoid controversy,7' the court concluded
that the New York Times decision had sought to safeguard the
constitutional values threatened by plaintiff. The court thus denied
permission to inquire into defendant's thoughts, opinions, and con-
clusions in preparing the broadcast.
In addition to relying on the newsperson's privilege, the concur-
ring opinion emphasized Justice Stewart's theory that the press has
a special status in a constitutional scheme.72 Justice Stewart had
argued that the free press clause guaranteed the press more than
freedom of expression since everyone is guaranteed such freedom
under the freedom of speech clause.73 Noting that the press is the
only private business given constitutional protection, Justice Stew-
68. 568 F.2d 974, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 21,
1978) (No. 77-1105).
69. Id. at 978-79.
70. Id. at 984.
71. Id. The court presupposed that one of the first amendment's purposes was to en-
courage the press to enter controversies in fulfilling its role of informing and protecting the
general public. Id.
72. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631 (1975). See also Lange, The Speech
and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 639 (1975);
Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J.
761 (1977).
73. Stewart, supra note 72, at 633. Justice Stewart argued: "If the Free Press guarantee
meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy." Id.
[Vol. 31:375
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art had asserted that the primary purpose for the freedom of press
guarantee was "to create a fourth institution outside the Govern-
ment as an additional check on the three official branches." The
concurring opinion concluded that in order to avoid anticipatory
self-censorship the special protection provided in the Constitution
for the media75 dictated that editorial selections concerning choice
of material, duration, and content of the broadcast be absolutely
privileged.5
The dissent maintained that Branzburg did not establish a
newsperson's privilege and that the instant decision therefore
lacked "precedential foundation. ' 77 Noting that a defamation ac-
tion under the New York Times standard required examination of
the defendant's subjective state of mind, the dissent argued that
investigation of editorial judgment was necessary to the cause of
action.78 The dissent concluded that because the purpose of a defa-
mation action was to impose a necessary chill in media expression,
a privilege protecting the editorial function was unnecessary.
IV. COMMENT
The instant court's recognition of an absolute editorial privilege
is difficult to justify in light of its reliance upon New York Times
and the cases prohibiting government infringement on press func-
tions. The constitutional background of the newsperson's privilege
reveals that it was not intended as a media defense in a defamation
action. Branzburg, CBS, and Tornillo involved some form of govern-
ment interference79 that provoked the Court to protect the press by
finding that the first amendment values of free expression out-
weighed the asserted states' interests. In the instant case, however,
the government did not interfere with the media's right to gather,
process, and disseminate the news. A public figure attempted to
protect an interest in his reputation. The Supreme Court has never
indicated under the newsperson's privilege line of cases that the
press should be granted an absolute editorial privilege in not re-
74. Id. at 634.
75. 568 F.2d at 988-89 (Oakes, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 995.
77. Id. at 996 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 997. The dissent noted that the New York Times standard focused upon an
examination of the defendant's subjective state of mind and as such had a consequent chilling
effect on the media. By suggesting that the publication of falsehoods should be discouraged,
the dissent justified the resulting deterrent effect. Id. at 995.
79. In Branzburg the three reporters resisted a compelled appearance to testify before
a grand jury hearing. Both CBS and Tornillo dealt with attempted government regulation of
newspapers or broadcasting stations.
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sponding to inquiries about a newsperson's thought processes in a
defamation action. In New York Times the Supreme Court ruled
that a public figure could recover damages only if he proved that a
statement was knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of the
facts. By erecting such a demanding standard, the Court perceived
that the press would be encouraged to pursue public issues in a
relentless and uninhibited manner, but a public figure plaintiff still
would be able to recover damages when the press had engaged in
gross indiscretions. Since New York Times was decided, the Su-
preme Court has considered several defamation cases to clarify the
standards enunciated therein, and none of these cases indicates a
desire by the Court to implement more stringent protections for the
press in public figure defamation cases. The effect of the instant
decision, however, is to narrow the application of discovery rules for
a public figure plaintiff, thereby increasing the plaintiff's difficulty
in meeting the heavy burden of proving the defendant's knowledge.
Because the press has the significant protection of the New
York Times standard, a public figure plaintiff should be entitled to
liberal pretrial discovery of information relevant to his cause of
action. The desired inquiries in the instant case are highly relevant.
Under St. Amant the defendant's subjective state of mind is critical
to the plaintiff's cause of action. By allowing a media defendant to
assert a privilege protecting disclosure of the defendant's subjective
state of mind, the court forces the plaintiff to meet the heavy burden
of proof required by New York Times without the benefit of discov-
ering the journalist's thoughts, opinions, and conclusions in prepar-
ing a publication or broadcast, and requires the trier of fact to draw
inferences about the state of an individual's mind from the facts
surrounding the alleged defamation. The court should have pro-
vided the plaintiff with some assurance that he would be given a full
opportunity to prove his claim. In Goldwater the Second Circuit
indicated that the trier of fact could appropriately infer a defen-
dant's recklessness or his knowledge of falsity from evidence of neg-
ligence, motive, or intent. 0 The trier of fact thus can reach a rea-
sonable conclusion about the defendant's subjective state of mind
at the time of publication.' The court should have emphasized this
point since its holding precludes a plaintiff's inquiry into relevant
aspects of the case within the defendant's sole control. By emphasiz-
ing the trier of fact's interpretative function in a defamation action,
80. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
81. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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the court could have accommodated fairly the public figure's inter-
est in protecting against injury to his reputation.
In addition, the court should have defined more precisely the
limits to be placed upon the protections afforded the press by an
absolute editorial privilege. In this case defendant turned over notes
and outtakes relevant to the broadcast of the alleged defamation,
choosing to make a stand on the intellectual decision making inher-
ent in the editorial process.8 2 Future media defendants, however,
likely will assert that the constitutional privilege announced in this
case protects notes and outtakes, arguing that to turn them over also
would have a chilling effect on the editorial process. Notes and
outtakes that are in the sole control of the defendant are material
items relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action and should be dis-
coverable since they are not part of the intellectual decision of what
information should be broadcast. By carefully confining the protec-
tion of the constitutional privilege to the newsperson's thought pro-
cesses, and by emphasizing the jury's interpretative function in a
defamation action, the court could have insulated the press from
any possible chilling effects while accommodating a public figure
plaintiff's right of access to relevant evidence bearing on a defama-
tion claim.
ALAN WILLIAM DUNCAN
Income Taxation-Alternative Tax-In
Computing Alternative Tax Under Section 1201 of
the Internal Revenue Code Taxpayer May Not
Deduct from Net Long-Term Capital Gain That
Portion of Capital Gain Required To Be Set Aside
Permanently for Charitable Organizations
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Decedent's will required taxpayer estate to distribute to speci-
fied charitable organizations a specific portion, of net long-term cap-
ital gain realized upon the sale of any securities included in the
82. CBS recognized that this was a case of first impression and chose to contest the
discoverability of the intellectual aspect of the editorial process by claiming an editorial
privilege. After this decision, CBS might decide to argue for an editorial privilege for notes
and outtakes relating to a broadcast. See N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
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residue of the estate.' In calculating the alternative tax' on the
capital gains realized by the estate in 1967 and 1968, taxpayer de-
ducted from capital gains the amounts required to be set aside for
charities.: The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the taxpayer's
1. The will of Walter E. Disney required taxpayer estate to set aside 45% of the residue
of the estate to designated charitable organizations. During 1967 and 1968, plaintiffs, United
California Bank and Lillian Disney Truyens, co-executors of the estate, sold certain securities
iicluded in the residue of the estate and realized net long-term capital gains of $500,622.38
and $1,058,018.43. In 1967 a net short-term capital gain of $16,944.16 also was realized. As
directed by the will, plaintiffs set aside 45% of the net long-term capital gain to the designated
charitable organizations.
2. The court construed the alternative tax provisions in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, §
1201(b), 68A Stat. 320 (now I.R.C. § 1201(b)), which read:
(b) Other Taxpayers.-If for any taxable year the net long-term capital gain of any
taxpayer (other than a corporation) exceeds the net short-term capital loss, then, in lieu
of the tax imposed by sections 1 and 511, there is hereby imposed a tax (if such tax is
less than the tax imposed by such sections) which shall consist of the sum of-
(1) a partial tax computed on the taxable income reduced by an amount
equal to 50 percent of such excess, at the rate and in the manner as if this
subsection had not been enacted, and
(2) an amount equal to 25 percent of the excess of the net long-term
capital gain over the net short-term capital loss.
See notes 10-14 infra and accompanying text.
3. The instant opinion contains the following hypothetical example as an illustration
of the taxpayer's method of computing the alternative tax. Although the actual figures in-
volved in the case differ, they approximate those used in this example. Assume that the
taxpayer estate realized and recognized $50,000 in ordinary income and $500,000 in net long-
term capital gain, and that the estate is required to set aside for charities 50% of its long-
term capital gain. Assume finally that an effective tax rate of 60% applies to this taxpayer.
Both the taxpayer and the government agreed that estate taxable income must be calcu-
lated in the following manner:
Gross Income $550,000
Less: § 1202 deduction $250,000
§ 642(c) deduction 125,000
(adjusted as required
by § 642(c) (4))
Total Deductions $375,000
Estate Taxable Income $175,000
Assuming a 60% effective rate, the tax owed by the estate (if the alternative tax is not
used) would be $105,000. The taxpayer computed the alternative tax in the following manner:
Estate Taxable Income $175,000
Less: 501/, of that portion of the excess of net
long-term capital gain over net short-term
capital loss not permanently set aside for
charity ($250,000) 125,000
Partial Taxable Income $ 50,000
Partial Tax (assume 6011c effective rate) 30,000
Tax on excess of net long-term capital gain over net
short-term capital loss not permanently set aside
for charity (25%, of $250,000) 62,500
Total Alternative Tax $ 92,500
1978] RECENT CASES
computation method, contending that a deduction for charitable set
asides and payments was not allowable under section 1201.1 Tax-
payer instituted a suit for refund of the additional tax paid,5 and the
district court granted the refund.' On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, reversed. In computing
the alternative tax under I.R.C. § 1201, a taxpayer may not deduct
from net long-term capital gain that portion of capital gain required
to be set aside permanently for charitable organizations. United
California Bank v. United States, 563 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (No. 77-1016).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress has continuously given preferential treatment to the
realization of capital gains, taxing them at a lower rate than ordi-
nary income. 7 The favored status of capital gains originally was
designed to allow individuals to sell or exchange capital assets with-
out fear of a prohibitive tax at ordinary rates." The alternative tax,
The alternative tax computed in the taxpayer's manner ($92,500) would be lower than
the tax that would be paid if no alternative computation were used ($105,000). United Cal.
Bank v. United States, 563 F.2d 400, 402-03 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586
(U.S. Mar. 21, 1978) (No. 77-1016).
4. The government argued that § 1201(b) requires computation on the excess of net
long-term gain over net short-term loss and that it does not mention any exclusion of amounts
required to be set aside permanently for charities. Assuming the same facts given in the
hypothetical in note 3, the government calculated the alternative tax in the following manner:
Estate Taxable Income $175,000
Less: 50/ of excess of net long-term capital gain
over net short-term capital loss ($500,000) 250,000
Partial Taxable Income -0-
Partial Tax -0-
Tax on excess of net long-term capital gain over
net short-term capital loss (25/ of $500,000) 125,000
Total Alternative Tax $125,000
Id. at 402.
Because the alternative tax computed by the government's method ($125,000) exceeded
the tax computed without using the alternative method ($105,000), the latter figure repre-
sented the correct tax in the government's view.
5. Taxpayer was assessed deficiencies in the amounts of $4,998.93 for 1967 and
$27,445.05 for 1968, plus interest of $1,099.76 and $4,386.41 for the respective years. Taxpayer
sought a refund of these amounts, which represent the additional tax owed as a result of the
government's disallowance of the taxpayer's alternative tax computation method. See notes
3-4 supra.
6. United Cal. Bank v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9164 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
7. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcom, TAXATION §§ 22.01-02 (rev. ed. 1973).
8. Id.
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which provides a further incentive for these taxpayers, permits tax
computation at a rate even more favorable than regular capital
gains treatment.' Prior to 1969, the alternative tax provisions of
section 1201 applied to all of an individual taxpayer's net long-term
gain.' Although relatively few taxpayers used the alternative tax,
those that did benefited substantially." Congressional concern that
section 1201 provided inordinate benefits to a select group of tax-
payers led to a considerable curtailment of the individual alterna-
tive tax by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.2 The amended version of
section 1201 provides that only the first 50,000 dollars of capital
gains are entitled to the alternative rate.' 3 By so amending section
1201, Congress eliminated the opportunity for taxpayers with large
amounts of capital gain to save substantial amounts of tax by using
the alternative method."
Few federal appellate decisions have addressed directly the al-
ternative tax provisions of the Code. In Weil v. Commissioner,"5
individual taxpayers calculated the alternative tax by using an ex-
cess of charitable contribution deductions over ordinary income to
9. Id. at § 22.07. The alternative tax provisions of § 1201 apply a flat 25% rate to capital
gains, thereby benefiting taxpayers who have an effective long-term capital gains rate in
excess of 25%.
10. Id. The instant case was decided under the pre-1969 alternative tax provision. See
note 2 supra.
11. In 1969 only 2% of all taxpayers reporting capital gains could compute an alterna-
tive tax that was lower than their tax computed at regular rates, but this group accounted
for approximately 28% of all capital gains reported by individual taxpayers. S. REP. No. 91-
552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 191, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2225
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. 91-552].
12. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 511(b), 83 Stat. 487, 635-36. The
House Report to this amendment advocated abolishing the alternative tax altogether. H.R.
REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 144-46, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1645, 1988. The Senate Report agreed with the objectives of the House Report, but
proposed to limit alternative tax treatment to the first $140,000 of capital gain in order to
allow taxpayers with relatively small amounts of capital gain to continue using the alternative
tax. S. REP. 91-552, supra note 11, at 192-94, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2226.
13. This limitation remains in the current version of I.R.C. § 1201. The $50,000 figure
represents a conference committee compromise. CONF. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
162-64, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2392, 2431-32.
14. With the current $50,000 limitation, the largest amount a taxpayer could save by
using the alternative method is $5,000. For example, assume that a taxpayer is in the 70%
bracket and that the application of the 50% capital gains deduction formula of § 1202 would
therefore result in an effective tax rate of 35%. The alternative tax rate of 25% can be applied
only to capital gains up to $50,000, giving an alternative tax of $12,500 on that maximum
amount. If the tax on the $50,000 was computed at the 35% effective rate, the amount owed
would be $17,500.
15. 229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1956). The Well court construed the alternative tax as it
existed in the 1939 Code. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 117(c), 53 Stat. 51 (now I.R.C. §
1201).
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reduce long-term capital gain before applying the twenty-five per-
cent rate.'" In affirming the Tax Court's rejection of the taxpayers'
method of alternative tax computation, the Sixth Circuit held that
these unused deductions could be used only to reduce ordinary in-
come, not to reduce taxable capital gain in computing the alterna-
tive tax.' 7 The Weil court emphasized that denying the taxpayers'
calculation method would not be unfair because the government's
alternative tax computation method also resulted in a tax substan-
tially lower than that provided by the regular method of tax compu-
tation.'"
Statler Trust v. Commissioner,'" decided by the Second Circuit
in 1966, represents the only case to consider directly whether a
taxpayer computing the alternative tax can deduct from long-term
capital gain an amount required to be set aside permanently for
charitable organizations. In Statler Trust the government argued
disallowance of the deduction on the ground that section 1201 does
not refer to any deductions for charitable contributions and is on its
face clear and unambiguous. " The government further contended
that a literal interpretation of the statute would not be unfair since,
as in Weil, the alternative tax computed by the government's
method still would be less than the tax computed without using the
alternative provision.2' In rejecting the government's strict interpre-
16. The deductions claimed by the taxpayers in Weil resulted from charitable contribu-
tions made by the taxpayers out of capital gains they had realized during the year. Because
these deductions exceeded the ordinary income of the taxpayers, they argued that they be
allowed first to use the deductions to reduce their ordinary income to zerb and then to use
the excess to reduce their long-term capital gain in computing the alternative tax.
17. 229 F.2d at 595-96.
18. Id. at 596. Courts, however, have not held uniformly against the taxpayer. A line of
cases allows taxpayers to use a § 691(c) deduction for estate taxes paid to offset capital gains
in computing the alternative tax. Read v. United States, 320 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1963); Meis-
sner v. United States, 364 F.2d 409 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Estate of Sidles v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
873 (1976). See also Quick v. United States, 503 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1974); Goodwin v. United
States, 458 F.2d 108 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Section 691(c) allows a deduction for estate taxes properly
allocable to income in respect of a decedent.
19. 361 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'g 43 T.C. 208 (1964). The taxpayer trust in Statler
Trust was required to make charitable gifts of not less than 15% nor more than 30% each year
from the net income of the trust. The charities were to be chosen by majority vote of the
trustees and the children of Ellsworth M. Statler, with the trustees to determine the precise
percentage of the gifts. A later settlement agreement between the trustees, the income benefi-
ciaries, and a representative of the undesignated charitable beneficiaries provided for a set
percentage of capital gain recognized on a specific sale of shares of stock to be paid to
charitable organizations. The Tax Court considered Weil to be applicable and controlling.
Statler Trust v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 208, 215 (1964); see notes 15-18supra and accompany-
ing text.
20. 361 F.2d at 130.
21. Id. at 130-31.
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tation, Judge Friendly's majority opinion in Statler Trust reasoned
that amounts required to be set aside permanently for charitable
use should fall within the conduit principle governing the trust pro-
visions of Subchapter J.22
The conduit principle of Subchapter J generally taxes estates
and trusts in the same manner as it taxes individuals, but provides
that income distributions to trust beneficiaries are deductible by
the estate and taxable to the beneficiaries.2 This approach necessi-
tates the use of a measure to impose a maximum limit on the total
distributions deductible by the estate or trust and taxable to the
beneficiaries. 2 For this purpose Congress devised the concept of
distributable net income, defined in section 643 to mean the taxable
income of the estate or trust with certain modifications.25 The con-
cept of distributable net income thus gives statutory expression to
the conduit principle since estates and trusts become only conduits
through which distributed taxable income of the current year flows
to and is taxed to the beneficiaries . 6 Income accumulated for future
distribution remains taxable to the estate or trust.27 Because section
643(a) (3)21 includes capital gains required to be distributed to chari-
ties within the definition of distributable net income, Judge
Friendly in Statler Trust determined that Congress considered such
22. Id. at 131-32. I.R.C. §§ 641-692 constitute Subchapter J and deal generally with
taxation of estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and decedents.
23. See I.R.C. §§ 651-652, 661-662; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted
in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4623, 4714-15 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 1622].
24. S. REP. 1622, supra note 23, at 82, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4715.
25. Id. at 343, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4984. Since the distributable
net income concept is used to determine the character of amounts distributed to a beneficiary,
the taxable income of the estate or trust must be adjusted by adding to it items of trust
income that are not includible in the gross income of the estate or trust, but are nevertheless
available for distribution to the beneficiaries. Section 643(a) defines distributable net income
as ihe taxable income of the estate or trust computed to include, among other things, amounts
deductible by the trust under § 661 as distributions and amounts deductible by the trust
under § 642(c) that are paid to charities. See note 28 infra.
26. S. REP. 1622, supra note 23, at 343, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4984.
27. Id.
28. I.R.C. § 643 provides in part:
(a) Distributable Net Income.-For purposes of this part, the term "distributable
net income" means, with respect to any taxable year, the taxable income of the estate
or trust computed with the following modifications-
(3) Capital gains and losses.-Gains from the sale or exchange of capital
assets shall be excluded to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus
and are not. . . (B) paid, permanently set aside, or to be used for the purposes
specified in section 642(c).
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charitable payments to be within the conduit structure of Subchap-
ter J.2"
The government criticized Judge Friendly's conduit analysis by
pointing out the differences between the general conduit approach
of Subchapter J and the special Code provisions applicable to chari-
table payments from trusts and estates.3 Although Subchapter J
generally treats amounts paid by the trust to beneficiaries as distri-
bution deductions for the trust under section 661(a),31 the Code
treats charitable payments as charitable deductions for the trust
under section 642(c)12 and forbids in section 663(a) (2)" a section 661
distribution deduction for amounts paid to charities. The govern-
ment contended that if Congress had intended that charitable pay-
ments be accorded Subchapter J conduit treatment, Congress
would not have provided for this separate treatment.3 4 The govern-
ment focused on the apparent inconsistency between the general
Subchapter J requirement that distributions to beneficiaries be in-
cluded in the income of the beneficiaries pursuant to section 662(a)31
29. 361 F.2d at 131-32. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Friendly undertook an exami-
nation of the relevant legislative history of Subchapter J. See notes 23-27 supra and accompa-
nying text.
30. 361 F.2d at 131.
31. I.R.C. § 661 provides in part:
(a) Deduction.-In any taxable year there shall be allowed as a deduction in
computing the taxable income of an estate or trust (other than a trust to which subpart
B applies), the sum of-
(1) any amount of income for such taxable year required to be distributed
currently (including any amount required to be distributed which may be paid
out of income or corpus to the extent such amount is paid out of income for such
taxable year); and
(2) any other amounts properly paid or credited or required to be distrib-
uted for such taxable year;
but such deduction shall not exceed the distributable net income of the estate or trust.
32. The version of § 642(c) in effect until 1969 authorized a deduction by an estate or
trust for any amount of gross income, without limitation, which pursuant to the terms of the
governing instrument is, during the taxable year, paid or permanently set aside for charity.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 642(c), 68A Stat. 215 (now I.R.C. § 642(c)). The Tax Reform
Act of 1969 amended § 642(c) to eliminate the unlimited deduction allowed trusts and estates
for amounts set aside for (rather than paid to) charity. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, § 201, 83 Stat. 487, 558-59. Under the current version of § 642(c), taxable trusts must
pay out their income currently to charities in order to obtain the charitable deduction.
33. I.R.C. § 663 provides in part:
(a) Exclusions.-There shall not be included as amounts falling within section
661(a) or 662(a)-
(2) Charitable, etc., distributions.-Any amount paid or permanently set
aside or otherwise qualifying for the deduction provided in section 642(c) (com-
puted without regard to sections 508(d), 681, and 4948(c)(4)).
34. 361 F.2d at 131-32.
35. I.R.C. § 662 provides in part:
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and the section 663(a)(2) prohibition against such inclusion in the
case of charitable payments. 6
Judge Friendly answered the government's objections by exam-
ining the legislative history of sections 642(c) and 663(a)(2) .3  He
determined that Congress had enacted section 642(c) to prevent
charitable gifts by trusts from being subject to the percentage limi-
tations imposed on individuals by section 170(b). 31 The opinion rea-
soned that the decision to enact the broad deduction of section
642(c) led Congress to enact section 663(a)(2) in order to prevent a
trust from having a double deduction and a beneficiary from claim-
ing a charitable deduction already taken by the trustee. 9 Judge
Friendly concluded that the strict reading of the Code urged by the
government exalted form over substance and conflicted with the
general congressional scheme of trust taxation .4 Finally, the Statler
Trust court noted that adoption of the government's literal interpre-
tation would increase the tax burden on either the charities or the
remaindermen, a result Congress was unlikely to have intended.4'
(a) Inclusion.-Subject to subsection (b), there shall be included in the gross
income of a beneficiary to whom an amount specified in section 661(a) is paid, credited,
or required to be distributed (by an estate or trust described in section 661), the sum of
the following amounts:
(1) Amounts required to be distributed currently.-The amount of income
for the taxable year required to be distributed currently to such beneficiary,
whether distributed or not ...
(2) Other amounts distributed.-All other amounts properly paid, cred-
ited, or required to be distributed to such beneficiary for the taxable year.
36. 361 F.2d at 131; see note 33 supra.
37. 361 F.2d at 132.
38. The House Report's detailed discussion of § 642 states: "Except as provided in
section 681 (relating to prohibited transactions, improper accumulations, and so forth), a
trust or estate is allowed an unlimited deduction for charitable contributions and is not sub-
ject to the limitation imposed on the charitable contributions of individuals." H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A 193, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4019, 4332.
I.R.C. § 170(b) places percentage limitations upon charitable contributions of certain
capital gain property by individual taxpayers.
39. The House Report's detailed discussion of § 663(a)(2) states:
Paragraph (3) provides that any amount paid, permanently set aside or to be used
for the purposes specified in section 642(c) (relating to charitable, etc., deductions) is
excluded from the provisions of sections 661 and 662. Since the estate or trust is allowed
a deduction under section 642(c) for these amounts, they are not allowed as an additional
deduction for distributions nor are they treated as amounts distributed for purposes of
section 662 in determining the amounts includible in the gross income of the beneficiar-
ies.
Id. at A 205, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4344.
40. 361 F.2d at 131-32.
41. Id. at 132. Judge Friendly reasoned that, if the trust were required to pay more tax,
it would do so by taking income away from amounts that otherwise would have gone either
to the charitable beneficiaries or to the remaindermen. Judge Friendly believed that a tax
paid out of amounts that would have gone to charities would encroach indirectly upon the
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District Judge Dooling's4 2 strong dissent in Statler Trust chal-
lenged the majority's conduit analysis . 3 The dissent emphasized
that the conduit provisions of Subchapter J constitute a tight and
explicit structure, but section 663(a)(2) removes payments out of
trusts to charities from this structure." The dissent found that the
inclusion in distributable net income of capital gains paid or set
aside to charity did not support an inference of general conduit
treatment for such amounts since sections 642(c) and 663(a)(2) evi-
dence a congressional refusal to treat distributable charitable
amounts in the general Subchapter J manner." He concluded that
the clear words of Congress provide a safer guide to statutory mean-
ing than the invocation of a purpose or spirit inferred from the more
general structural features of a very complex enactment." Although
Judge Dooling's well-articulated dissent urged further judicial scru-
tiny of the majority's conduit analysis, prior to the instant case
Statler Trust was the only federal appellate decision to address the
deduction of capital gains required to be set aside for charities in
the computation of the alternative tax.
III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In holding that set asides of capital gains to charity are not
accorded conduit treatment by the Internal Revenue Code and may
not be excluded by a trust in computing its alternative tax on capi-
tal gains, the instant court adopted an analysis substantially differ-
ent from that employed in the Statler Trust dissent. As a means of
demonstrating that the Code does not provide conduit treatment for
charitable gifts by insulating them from other transactions affecting
the taxable status of an estate or trust, the court constructed a
model of a true conduit approach. 7 The court contended that true
conduit treatment would suggest that charitable amounts be ex-
tax exempt status of charities afforded by § 501. On the other hand, to pay the tax out of
amounts that would otherwise have gone to the remaindermen would increase indirectly their
tax burden and thus would discourage trusts from including charities among the income
beneficiaries. In either situation, Judge Friendly concluded, the result would be inconsistent
with the favorable treatment Congress has accorded charities.
42. Judge Dooling from the Eastern District of New York sat by designation.
43. 361 F.2d at 133 (Dooling, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. Judge Dooling asserted that the consequence of Judge Friendly's conduit analy-
sis would require that currently distributable amounts, by their intrinsic nature, be charac-
terized as distributions and deductible as such on the trustee return under § 661(a). Since
by enacting § 642(c) and § 663(a)(2), Congress denied to charitable payments this conse-
quence, Judge Dooling reasoned that a conduit analysis was invalid.
46. Id.
47. 563 F.2d at 404-05.
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cluded from the distributable net income concept rather than being
included within distributable net income by section 643(a)(3).11
Addressing the determination of the amounts includible in the gross
income of an estate or trust beneficiary under a pure conduit ap-
proach, the instant opinion stated that section 662 ideally would
allocate only an amount reduced by charitable distributions and
would not be limited by a distributable net income figure arrived
at after allowing an unlimited deduction for charitable contribu-
tions. 9 The court insisted that no deduction would ever be taken
under a pure conduit approach for amounts set aside for charity in
computing the taxable income of an estate or trust. These amounts
simply would be excluded from gross income altogether." The court
further argued that a pure conduit approach would necessitate cal-
culating the regular tax by excluding charitable payments from
gross income, not by relying on the deductions provided by sections
642(c) and 1202. 5' The court also insisted that consistent application
of the conduit approach would require a provision in section 120252
requiring the exclusion of capital gains distributed to or set aside
for charity in computing the long-term capital gain deduction.53
Confronted with the apparent inconsistencies between the tax-
payer's conduit theory and the structural characteristics of the
Code, the court agreed with the Statler Trust dissent that the word-
ing of the statute was too plain to be inadvertent and felt compelled
to follow closely the precise language of the Code.54 Although recog-
nizing that its decision precluded the taxpayer from using the alter-
native tax provision because the regular tax on capital gains would
be lower than the government's computation, the court concluded
48. Id. at 404; see notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
49. 563 F.2d at 404.
50. Id.
51. Id. I.R.C. § 1202 allows a taxpayer to deduct 50% of net capital gain from gross
income. Although § 642(c) allows an unlimited deduction for charitable contributions, §
642(c)(4) provides that proper adjustment be made for any deduction allowable to an estate
or trust under § 1202. Estates and trusts thus are allowed to deduct an adjusted amount for
charitable distributions under § 642(c) after taking the general capital gains deduction under
§ 1202. See the deduction calculations in note 3 supra.
The calculation of the regular tax on capital gains is the same if payments to charities
simply are excluded from gross income at the outset or if the charitable payments are de-
ducted from gross income during the computation process as the Code requires.
52. See note 51 supra. Section 1202 requires the exclusion of capital gains that under §
652 and § 662 are includible in the gross income of income beneficiaries of estates or trusts
as gain derived from the sale or exchange of capital assets.
53. 563 F.2d at 405.
54. Id. at 405-06. The instant opinion refused to apply the line of decisions allowing the
deduction for estate taxes allocable to income in respect of a decedent under § 691(c) against
capital gain in computing the alternative tax. See note 18 supra.
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that its decision satisfied both the letter and the spirit of the appli-
cable provisions of the Code and was not unfair to the taxpayer.55
Despite its initial recognition that Statler Trust was directly on
point, the Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the government
that Statler Trust was decided wrongly.56 Its decision thus created
a circuit court split on the issue whether amounts required to be set
aside for or distributed to charities can be excluded from net long-
term capital gain in the computation of the alternative tax.
IV. COMMENT
In applying a literal interpretation of the alternative tax provi-
sions of section 1201, the instant court disregarded the intent and
spirit of the Code provisions relating to trust taxation. Instead of
analyzing carefully the legislative history of the alternative tax and
of the hybrid conduit scheme of Subchapter J, the court took the
narrow view that Congress's failure to adopt a pure conduit ap-
proach mandated a literal interpretation of the wording of the alter-
native tax provision. The legislative history of Subchapter J clearly
shows that Congress intended to adopt a conduit approach in its
treatment of trusts and estates when it devised the concept of dis-
tributable net income.57 Statler Trust correctly points to the inclu-
sion in distributable net income of amounts required to be paid to
or set aside for charities as evidence of a congressional intent to
accord Subchapter J conduit treatment to these amounts. Even the
dissent in Statler Trust indicates that this analysis would be correct
if sections 642(c) and 663(a)(2) did not evidence a separate treat-
ment for charitable payments.5 8 As the Statler Trust majority dis-
covered upon examination of the legislative history of sections
642(c) and 663(a)(2), these sections were enacted to serve specific
and limited purposes and clearly were not intended to take charita-
ble payments made by trusts out of the Subchapter J conduit struc-
ture. 9
Unlike the clear articulation of the issues by the Statler Trust
dissent, the instant opinion's confusing construction of a pure con-
duit approach to trust taxation ignores the intent of Congress be-
hind the conduit-like principle embodied in Subchapter J. Although
the court correctly discerns that a pure conduit approach would
55. 563 F.2d at 406. The court cited Weil. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
56. 563 F.2d at 402.
57. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
58. 361 F.2d at 133; see notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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eliminate the necessity for the distributable net income concept by
providing for exclusions instead of deductions,"0 Congress never in-
tended to apply a pure conduit approach to trust taxation. Instead,
Congress has established a hybrid conduit system in the mechanism
of Subchapter J. The court fails to note that its objections to the
taxpayer's conduit arguments are not confined merely to charitable
payments out of trusts, but apply logically to any characterization
of the entire Subchapter J structure as a conduit approach.
The instant decision further fails to explain clearly that sec-
tions 642(c) and 663(a)(2) treat charitable payments differently
than other Subchapter J distributions. Although Judge Friendly in
Statler Trust opined that the legislative history of these sections
indicated that their purpose was not to take payments from trusts
to charities out of the conduit approach of Subchapter J, Judge
Dooling's dissent had made a plausible argument that these sections
should be read to deny the conduit principle to such payments. By
not recognizing and utilizing this argument, the instant court de-
prived itself of the most effective analysis supporting its conclusion.
The validity of the court's analysis also is diminished by its
assumption that had Congress intended a conduit approach for in-
come distributed to charitable beneficiaries, section 1202 would re-
quire estates and trusts to exclude charitable payments in calculat-
ing the fifty percent capital gains deduction in the same manner
that section 1202 currently requires the exclusion from this calcula-
tion of capital gains includible in the gross income of noncharitable
trust beneficiaries under sections 652 and 662.61 This argument ig-
nores the tax-free status given to charitable beneficiaries by the
Code. The exclusion provision in section 1202 clearly was intended
to prevent a trust from taking a capital gains deduction on amounts
that would be taxed to the trust beneficiaries. Section 642(c) pro-
vides a special unlimited deduction for trusts making contributions
to charities intended to encourage taxpayers to contribute to chari-
ties and is taken after the section 1202 capital gains deduction." If
the section 1202 capital gains deduction had to be passed through
to charitable beneficiaries who have no taxable income, the benefit
of the capital gains deduction would be lost. 3 Therefore, the exclu-
60. Judge Sneed's opinion raised both conceptual and semantic objections to using
deductions instead of exclusions in any type of conduit system. While this position is theoreti-
cally correct, it ignores the mechanism embodied in Subchapter J.
61. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 51 supra.
63. The argument that the loss of the full § 1202 capital gains deduction would be
recovered by the trust in using the full § 642(c) charitable deduction without adjustment is
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sion provision in section 1202 should be interpreted as a measure to
preserve the full benefit of the deduction for capital gains paid to
charities, not as evidence of congressional intent to take these distri-
butions outside the conduit structure of Subchapter J.
As Judge Friendly in Statler Trust correctly noted, if conduit
treatment is not accorded charitable payments in the computation
of the alternative tax, the resulting increase in tax will be borne
ultimately by either the charities or the remaindermen. 4 Although
Judge Friendly might have been exaggerating when he contended
that a decision against the taxpayer is an indirect incursion on the
tax exemption afforded charities by the Code, he undoubtedly is
correct in noting that decisions such as the instant case inevitably
will lessen the attractiveness of including charities in the income
beneficiaries of trusts. Congress could not have intended such an
adverse effect in light of the general Code policy favoring charities
and encouraging charitable contributions.
The practical significance of the instant case has been tem-
pered by the changes made in the Code in 1969. Both Statler Trust
and the instant case concerned taxable years prior to these Code
changes. Section 1201 now expressly limits the availability of the
alternative tax computation to the first 50,000 dollars of capital
gains.' 5 As a result of this limitation, large amounts of tax in taxable
years subsequent to 1969 will not be disputed because of different
alternative tax computation methods. Furthermore, although both
Statler Trust and the instant case clearly apply to both current
charitable payments as well as charitable set asides, the current
version of section 642 applies only to current payment situations
and denies a deduction for charitable set asides." Indeed, with the
substantial erosion of section 1201 by the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Congress possibly will not retain the alternative tax in any form. 7
Despite the impact of the 1969 Code amendments on the signif-
icance of the instant case, the issue remains relevant because many
high-bracket taxpayers will continue to use the alternative tax for
the first 50,000 dollars of their net long-term capital gains. Since
difficult to justify. The Code clearly is not written in this manner. Congress designed the §
1202 deduction to be taken first, with any necessary adjustment for charitable deductions to
be made afterward pursuant to § 642(c)(4). The instant opinion recognized that these two
sections interact in this manner in its illustration of the conflicting alternative tax computa-
tion methods. 563 F.2d at 402; see notes 3 & 51 supra.
64. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 32 supra.
67. See note 12 supra.
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Congress has moved to limit the application of the alternative tax,
it should set forth clearly the method of computation that should
be used. In the absence of congressional action, a careful and
thoughtful analysis of the relevant legislative history such as that
undertaken by Judge Friendly in Statler Trust should lead the
courts to conclude that Congress intended charitable payments
from trusts to receive conduit treatment and that estates and trusts
should not be required to include capital gains paid to charities in
computing the alternative tax on net long-term capital gains.
ELTON GREGORY SNOWDEN
Income Taxation-Corporate Reorganization-
Stock Received Under Contingent Payment
Plan Is Subject to Imputed Interest
Provisions of Section 483 of the
Internal Revenue Code
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Taxpayers,' pursuant to a "type B"2 plan of reorganization,
transferred their stock in the acquired corporation to the acquiring
corporation for common stock and preferred stock in the acquiring
corporation plus the right to receive additional shares of common
stock in the acquiring corporation under a contingency provision.3
1. Taxpayers are husband and wife.
2. A "type B" reorganization is defined by I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), which provides:
(a) Reorganization.-
(1) In General.-For purposes of parts I and II and this part, the term
"reorganization" means-
(B) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or
a part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the
voting stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquiring corpora-
tion), of stock of another corporation if, immediately after the acquisi-
tion, the acquiring corporation has control of such other corporation
(whether or not such acquiring corporation had control immediately be-
fore the acquisition); ....
3. Under the provision taxpayers would receive additional shares of common stock in
the acquiring corporation if three years from the effective date of the reorganization taxpayers
retained the shares initially received and the market value of the common stock was less than
120% of the market value on the date of reorganization or if the market value of the preferred
stock initially received was less than $100 per share. The plan set out a formula for computing
the number of shares to which taxpayers would be entitled if the contingencies occurred.
During the contingency period, the acquiring corporation placed in a reserve account the
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The plan did not provide that the acquiring corporation would pay
interest to taxpayers on these additional shares if ultimately re-
ceived under the contingency provision. When taxpayers, under the
contingency provision, received additional shares of common stock
in the acquiring corporation three years after the effective date of
the reorganization, they reported no income with respect to the
additional shares.4 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, relying
on section 4835 of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires that a
maximum number of shares that taxpayers might receive. During the contingency period,
taxpayers had no right to vote the shares in the reserve or to receive dividends thereon.
4. When the acquired corporation's stockholders receive stock under a "type B" plan
of reorganization, they recognize no gain or loss by virtue of I.R.C. § 354(a)(1), which pro-
vides:
(a) General Rule.-
(1) In General.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in
a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorgan-
ization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another
corporation a party to the reorganization.
5. I.R.C. § 483 provides in pertinent part:
(a) AMouNTs CONSTITNG INTEREsT.-For the purposes of this title, in the case of
any contract for the sale or exchange of property there shall be treated as interest that
part of a payment to which this section applies which bears the same ratio to the amount
of such payment as the total unstated interest under such contract bears to the total of
the payments to which this section applies which are due under such contract.
(b) TOTAL UNSTATED INTERET.-For purposes of this section, the term "total un-
stated interest" means . . . an amount equal to the excess of-
(1) the sum of the payments to which this section applies which are due
under the contract, over
(2) the sum of the present values of such payments and the present values
of any interest payments due under the contract.
For purposes of paragraph (2), the present value of the payment shall be determined,
as of the date of the sale or exchange, by discounting such payment at the rate, and in
the manner, provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary. ...
(c) PAYMENTS TO WHICH SECTION APPuEs.-
(1) In general.-Except as provided in subsection (f), this section shall
apply to any payment on account of the sale or exchange of property which
constitutes part or all of the sales price and which is due more than 6 months
after the date of such sale or exchange under a contract-
(A) under which some or all of the payments are due more than one
year after the date of such sale or exchange, and
(B) under which, using a rate provided by regulations prescribed by
the Secretary for purposes of this subparagraph, there is total unstated
interest.
(2) Treatment of evidence of indebtedness.-For purposes of this section,
an evidence of indebtedness of the purchaser given in consideration for the sale
or exchange of property shall not be considered a payment. . ..
(d) PAYMENTS THAT ARE INDEFINITE AS TO TIME, LLAIrL, OR AMouNT.-In the case
of a contract for the sale or exchange of property under which the liability for, or the
amount or due date of, any portion of a payment cannot be determined at the time of
the sale or exchange, this section shall be separately applied to such portion as if it (and
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certain portion of each deferred payment received under a contract
for the sale or exchange of property be treated as interest, assessed
a deficiency for that year, claiming that taxpayers had failed to
report an appropriate portion of the additional shares as interest
income. In response to taxpayers' petition for a redetermination of
the deficiency, the Tax Court of the United States upheld the Com-
missioner's application of section 483. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held; affirmed. When a taxpayer
receives additional shares of stock under a contingency provision in
a plan of reorganization, and the plan provides for no interest on the
additional shares, a portion of the shares so received will be treated
as imputed interest under section 483 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Solomon v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1977).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 368(a) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code includes
under the definition of corporate reorganization the acquisition of
the stock of one corporation by another corporation solely in ex-
change for voting stock of the acquiring corporation.' Section
354(a)(1) provides that shareholders of the acquired corporation
shall recognize no gain or loss on such an exchange.' The theory
any amount of interest attributable to such portion) were the only payments due under
the contract; and such determinations of liability, amount, and due date shall be made
at the time payment of such portion is made.
(f) ExCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.-
(1) Sales price of $3,000 or less.-This section shall not apply to any pay-
ment on account of the sale or exchange of property if it can be determined at
the time of such sale or exchange that the sales price cannot exceed $3,000.
(2) Carrying charges.-In the case of the purchaser, the tax treatment of
amounts paid on account of the sale or exchange of property shall be made
without regard to this section if any such amounts are treated under section
163(b) as if they include interest.
(3) Treatment of seller.-In the case of the seller, the tax treatment of any
amounts received on account of the sale or exchange of property shall be made
without regard to this section if all of the gain, if any, on such sale or exchange
would be considered ordinary income.
(4) Sales or exchanges of patents.-This section shall not apply to any
payments made pursuant to a transfer described in section 1235(a) (relating to
sale or exchange of patents).
(5) Annuities.-This section shall not apply to any amount the liability for
which depends in whole or in part on the life expectance of one or more individu-
als and which constitutes an amount received as an annuity to which section
72 applies.
All references to sections in this Comment refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
6. Sidney R. Solomon, 67 T.C. 379 (1976).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. See note 4 supra.
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justifying this nonrecognition treatment is that a reorganization
based on a valid business purpose merely adjusts the form of corpo-
rate ownership and is therefore an inappropriate occasion for taxa-
tion. The Supreme Court adopted this theory in Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner,' and it is currently embodied in
Treasury regulations promulgated under section 368.10
Desiring to obtain the tax deferral benefits of section 354,"
many taxpayers planning a reorganization sought to bring their
transactions within the requirements of the reorganization provi-
sions. Problems in determining the value of the stock of each corpo-
ration, however, produced difficulties for the taxpayer who wished
to consummate the reorganization in one step.'2 Therefore, taxpay-
ers frequently structured plans of reorganization to include, in addi-
tion to an initial distribution of stock by the acquiring corporation,
a contingency agreement entitling the stockholders of the acquired
corporation to additional shares of the acquiring corporation if and
when the contingencies provided for occurred.
Initially, such contingency agreements risked violating the
''solely in exchange for voting stock" requirement of section
368(a)(1)(B).' 3 In 1960, however, the Eighth Circuit in Carlberg v.
9. 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
10. I.R.C. § 368; Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), (c) (1955).
11. Although § 354 provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on transfers of stock
pursuant to reorganization plans meeting its requirements, the taxpayer does not perma-
nently avoid recognizing gain or loss but only defers recognition by virtue of § 356 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which provides for a carryover of basis from the stock transferred in
the reorganization to the stock received in the reorganization.
12. Often, even if the acquiring corporation's stock is traded on a national exchange,
the stockholders of the acquired corporation may suspect that the market price is inflated.
Similarly, the price may be so unstable that it is impossible to determine the value of the
acquiring corporation's stock. Therefore, in a reorganization it may be desirable for the
stockholders of the acquired corporation to receive some assurance that the shares they
receive will not suffer a future decrease in value. This assurance usually consists of a contin-
gency provision, which is a promise by the acquiring corporation to distribute more of its
common stock to the acquired corporation's stockholders in the event that the market value
of the acquiring corporation's stock declines. The contingency provision normally sets out a
formula for the calculation of the precise number of shares to be distributed and fixes maxi-
mum and minimum numbers of shares that can be distributed.
A similar problem may exist in determining the value of the acquired corporation and
the extent of its liabilities. In reorganizations in which the acquiring corporation acquires all
the stock of the acquired corporation, no stock market value will exist on which to base a
contingency provision. It is therefore customary to make additional stock payment provisions
contingent on both the future earnings of the acquired corporation and a complete determina-
tion of its liabilities.
13. In defining a "type B" reorganization, § 368(a)(1)(B) requires that the stock of the
acquired corporation be acquired "in exchange solely for all or a part of its [the acquiring
corporation's] voting stock." If the transaction fails to meet this requirement, the transaction
will not qualify for tax-free treatment.
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United States'4 reviewed a plan of reorganization under which the
acquired corporation's shareholders received an initial distribution
of stock plus "certificates of contingent interest"'5 and held that
such certificates constituted "voting stock" under section
368(a)(1) (B). Reasoning that the certificates were either "stock or
they were nothing,"' 6 the court found that the certificates did not
constitute "other property" under section 356,'1 and that the trans-
action therefore qualified as a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(B). This decision enabled taxpayers to use contingency
provisions without risking a violation of the requirements of section
368.
Four years after Carlberg, Congress added section 483 to the
Internal Revenue Code. 8 Section 483 applies to contracts for the
sale or exchange of property in which part or all of the purchase
price is to be deferred for more than one year. If the contract fails
to provide for adequate interest, a certain portion of each payment
received by the seller more than six months after the sale shall be
treated as interest. 9 Section 483 was enacted to prevent taxpayers
from converting interest income into capital gain when selling capi-
tal assets. 20 It did not expressly purport to affect the use of contin-
gency stock provisions in corporate reorganizations. 2' The section
expressly applies, however, to "any contract for the sale or exchange
of property, ' 2  and its legislative history states that it was intended
14. 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960). See also Rev. Rul. 67-90, 1967-1 C.B. 79; Rev. Proc.
67-13, 1967-1 C.B. 590; Rev. Proc. 67-34, 1966-2 C.B. 1232.
15. "Certificates of contingent interest" are certificates that entitle the former share-
holders of the acquired corporation to additional shares of common stock of the acquiring
corporation if the contingencies provided for occur.
16. 281 F.2d at 519.
17. The court found that the "certificates of contingent interest" represented nothing
more than an interest in common stock and that the fact that the exact number of shares to
be distributed thereunder could not be determined on the effective date of reorganization did
not alter the character of the certificates. Id.
18. I.R.C. § 483 was enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 224(a), 78 Stat. 19 (1964), on
February 26, 1964.
19. See note 5 supra.
20. A seller accomplishes this conversion by inflating the sale price to account for
interest, accepting payment over a period of years, and including no interest in the payments.
The seller, therefore, recognizes only capital gain on the transaction. Of course, by including
no interest in the payments, the buyer loses a deduction for the interest he would have paid,
but when the buyer is in a significantly lower tax bracket than the seller, the resulting
adjustment of the selling price will be beneficial to both.
21. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-75 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1380-82; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-04 (1964);
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1774-77.
22. I.R.C. § 483(a). Section 483 also states that it applies "for all purposes of this title."
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to apply for "all purposes of the Code." 3 Furthermore, 483(f) lists
five exceptions to which section 483 does not apply, 4 implying that
Congress intended to exempt only those enumerated exceptions.
The exceptions listed in 483(f) do not include contingent stock pay-
ments received in a reorganization. Moreover, section 483 specifi-
cally applies to contingent payments in general,2" and the legislative
history indicates that Congress did not intend to limit the applica-
tion of section 483 to transactions in which gain or loss is recognized
by the seller. 21 Thus, neither the section's express terms nor its
legislative history suggests inapplicability to corporate reorganiza-
tions.
In 1966, the Treasury Department published final regulations
defining "payments" under section 483 to include stock.27 The regu-
lations contained examples demonstrating the effect of section 483,
two of which dealt with shareholders receiving stock under contin-
gency provisions in corporate reorganizations.2 These regulations
distinguished between two types of contingency provisions. If the
acquiring corporation retains the shares that may be transferred
ultimately, the regulations provide that the imputed interest provi-
sions of section 483 apply to the additional shares. 9 On the other
hand, if the contingent shares are placed in an escrow account and
the shareholders of the acquired corporation have the right to vote
the shares and receive dividends, upon which they are taxed, the
regulations state that section 483 does not apply to the additional
shares if ultimately released from escrow to the shareholders of the
acquired corporation.'" In addition, Treasury Regulation 1.483-
2(b) (3)31 specifically states that section 483 applies to deferred
transfers of stock under contingency provisions of a plan of reorgani-
zation notwithstanding section 354.
After the publication of the regulations under section 483, the
23. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A84 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1510.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. I.R.C. § 483(d). Section 483(d) provides that § 483 applies notwithstanding that the
"liability for, or the amount or due date . . . cannot be determined at the time of the sale or
exchange. .. "
26. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended § 483 to apply regardless
of whether the seller recognized gain on the transaction so long as the gain, if recognized,
would be capital gain. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A87 (1963), reprinted in
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1512-13.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(1) (1966).
28. Id. § 1.483-(1)(b)(6), examples 7 & 8 (1966).
29. Id. example 7.
30. Id. example 8.
31. Treas Reg. § 1.483-2(b)(3) (1966).
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Internal Revenue Service published Revenue Ruling 67-90,32 which
reiterated the Carlberg rule but added the caveat that section 483
may apply to any shares transferred under a contingency provision.
Subsequent revenue rulings dealing with section 483's treatment of
shares received under contingency provisions in reorganization
plans ruled that when the indicia of ownership33 required by the
regulations were not present, section 483 would apply to the addi-
tional shares transferred.3 4 When the required indicia of ownership
were present, however, no interest would be imputed under section
483.35 Therefore, section 483 apparently constituted a new hurdle for
taxpayers who sought to use contingency provisions in their reorgan-
izations. In Fox v. United States, 3 however, the Third Circuit ruled
that notwithstanding its broad wording and background, section 483
must yield to the specific provisions of section 7131 in cases of con-
flict therewith. By analogy, this decision suggested that taxpayers
might be able to avoid section 483 by demonstrating conflict with
the reorganization sections of the Code, but in a 1976 decision,
Sidney R. Solomon, 31 the Tax Court upheld the regulations, stating
that section 483 applies to transfers of additional stock under con-
tingency provisions in reorganization plans when the shareholders
32. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
33. The "indicia of ownership" are the rights to vote the shares and receive the divi-
dends thereon. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(6), example 8 (1966).
34. Rev. Rul. 73-298, 1973-2 C.B. 173; Rev. Rul. 73-300, 1970-1 C.B. 125.
35. Rev. Rul. 70-120, 1970-1 C.B. 124. The rationale for not imputing interest when the
required indicia of ownership are present is that the transfer of the contingent shares actually
"occurs" on the effective date of reorganization. Thus the subsequent release from escrow
does not constitute the "payment" required to trigger § 483.
In each of the rulings and regulations applying § 483 to contingency plans, the contin-
gency provisions in question made the additional stock transfers depend on the future earn-
ings of the acquired corporation. In 1973, however, the Internal Revenue Service published
Revenue Ruling 73-298 which ruled that § 483 also applies when additional stock transfers
are contingent upon the future market price of the acquired corporation's stock. This ruling
therefore eliminated the belief that the Internal Revenue Service would only apply § 483 to
contingency provisions based on the future earnings of the acquired corporation.
36. 510 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1975).
37. Section 71 provides that periodic payments incident to a divorce are included in the
gross income of the wife, but nonperiodic or lump-sum payments are not. In Fox taxpayer
claimed that interest should be imputed under § 483 to nonperiodic payments incident to a
divorce that he was paying to his wife. The court denied this contention, finding that under
§ 215, only those portions of the payments includable in the gross income of the wife are
deductible by the husband, and finding that under § 71 the full amount of the nonperiodic
payments is excluded from the gross income of the wife. Since treating any portion of the
payments as interest income to the wife would conflict with § 71, the court held that § 483
did not apply. Therefore, since no portion of the payments was included in the income of the
wife, under § 215 no portion was deductible by the husband.
38. 67 T.C. 379 (1976). This was the Tax Court's decision in the instant case. See note
6 supra and accompanying text.
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of the acquired corporation do not receive, on the effective date of
reorganization, sufficient indicia of ownership. 39 In a holding similar
to that in Solomon, the Court of Claims in Jeffers v. United States'
ruled that in applying section 483 to contingent reorganization
transfers, the Commissioner need not show that the parties in-
tended any portion of the payments to represent interest if the
transaction presented a potential for abuse by converting interest
into capital gain.4' The Jeffers court also rejected the argument that
under Carlberg the contingent rights were "stock" so that any
shares ultimately transferred pursuant to the contingent rights
should be treated as having been received on the effective date of
reorganization. The court argued that Carlberg was concerned with
the nature of the shares ultimately transferred, not the question of
the timing of the transfer. Thus a finding that the shares were
transferred subsequent to the effective date of reorganization did
not conflict with Carlberg.42 The Tax Court subsequently affirmed
the Solomon decision in Alfred H. Catterall, Sr.43 and again in John
Cocker, III," finding the language of section 483 broad enough to
apply to corporate reorganizations. In Cocker the court also cited a
potential for abuse argument similar to that of the Jeffers court."
A number of decisions thus had upheld the application of sec-
39. Id. at 387. According to the court, the required indicia of ownership were those
specified in Revenue Ruling 70-120. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. Also, the court
rejected petitioners' argument that the transfer of additional shares was not a payment under
§ 483, noting that the regulations clearly indicated that the transfer in question was a pay-
ment. 67 T.C. at 385-86.
40. 556 F.2d 986 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
41. Id. at 995. The court found that the legislative history indicated that Congress did
not intend to hinge the application of § 483 on a finding that the parties intended any portion
of the payments to account for interest. Rather, in view of the economic reality that a deferred
payment is not equivalent to a current payment, Congress determined that when there was
no provision for interest in the deferred payment, there was a potential for abuse-the conver-
sion of interest into capital gain-and in such cases interest should be imputed. Id.
42. Id. at 996. Moreover, the court found that what the taxpayer actually received on
the effective date of reorganization was an "evidence of indebtedness," which, by virtue of §
483(c)(2), was not a "payment." Thus, the "payment" of the stock eventually transferred
could not be considered to have been received on the effective date of reorganization. Id. at
996-97.
43. 68 TAx CT. RaP. DEC. (P-H) 228. The court in Catterall ruled that the absence of
language such as that in I.R.C. § 1250 which provides that "[t]his section shall apply
notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle," did not make § 483 inapplicable,
stating that when the language is broad enough to include a particular application, it is
immaterial that Congress did not have that application in mind when it enacted the legisla-
tion.
44. 68 TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 302.
45. Id. at 308. The court found that, in substance, in contracts utilizing deferred pay-
ments, the payments usually included a portion that represented compensation for not receiv-
ing the payment immediately.
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tion 483 to corporate reorganizations, citing among other factors, the
potential for abuse in reorganizations. Several of these holdings had
been based on findings that because the contingent payments in
question did not occur on the effective date of reorganization but on
the date of the ultimate transfer, they were deferred payments
under section 483. The courts had not yet identified, however, the
specific elements in contingency provisions that created the poten-
tial for abuse, nor had they enunciated clearly the criteria used to
detemine whether deferred payments "occurred" on the effective
date of reorganization.
Ill. THE INSTANT OPINION
The instant court initially enumerated the objective require-
ments for applying section 483 to deferred payments." Reviewing
the legislative history of the section, the court determined that Con-
gress intended courts to apply section 483 whenever these require-
ments are present" without probing into the specific facts of the
transaction or the subjective intent of the parties to determine if any
abuse would result.4" Since petitioners had conceded that if the
ultimate transfer were a "payment," the transaction would meet the
objective criteria of section 483,11 the court focused on petitioners'
contention that the ultimate transfer of additional shares did not
constitute a "payment."5 The court determined that on the effec-
tive date of the reorganization, petitioners had so few indicia of
ownership of the shares ultimately transferred5' that payment had
not occurred on that date. Moreover, the court found that since on
the effective date of reorganization, the ultimate transfer depended
46. Solomon v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d at 32-33. The court stated that § 483 required
a portion of any payment deferred more than six months to be treated as interest when the
payment constituted all or a part of the purchase price under a contract for the sale or
exchange of property, which deferred payment for more than one year and provided for no
interest or inadequate interest. Id.
47. Id. at 34. The court found that the presence of these objective criteria usually
evidenced a potential for abuse and concluded that Congress had opted for a "broad prophy-
lactic approach," under which § 483 would apply whenever the requisite criteria were present,
regardless of the subjective intent of the parties. Id. at 33.
48. Id. at 34. The court felt that determining the subjective intent of the parties would
pose a difficult if not insurmountable problem. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 34.
51. Id. The court noted that petitioners were not entitled to vote the shares, nor to
receive and pay taxes on dividends. Also, the court cited Revenue Ruling 70-120 with respect
to the relation between rights transferred on the effective date of reorganization and the
determination of when payment occurred. The court did not expressly rule, however, as to
the validity of that Ruling. Id.; see note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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on subsequent conditions, petitioners had in substance received an
"evidence of indebtedness, ' 52 which did not constitute a
"payment."53 The court therefore concluded that because the peti-
tioners received "payment" on the date of ultimate transfer, not on
the effective date of reorganization, and because the other criteria
of section 483 concededly were met, section 483 applied.14
In addition to finding that the transfer in question met the
objective requirements of section 483, the court enunciated a policy
for applying section 483 to contingency-provision transfers.55 The
court pointed out that notwithstanding the parties' intent, petition-
ers could have demanded additional shares to compensate them for
foregoing dividend and other ownership rights56 during the contin-
gency period in the shares ultimately transferred. Thus the court
used the potential for abuse present in reorganizations utilizing con-
tingency provisions, not the actual intent of the parties, as the justi-
fication for applying section 483. 51
The court also addressed petitioners' contention that applying
section 483 to impute interest, taxable as ordinary income, conflicts
with the Code's reorganization provisions, which are designed to
make the transaction tax-free. 8 The court rebutted this contention
by noting that section 354(a)(1),11 which affords the shareholders
"tax-free" treatment in a reorganization, states that "no gain or loss
shall be recognized" on the exchange of stock, but does not purport
to preclude the recognition of other forms of income."0 Finding that
52. 570 F.2d at 34. The court reasoned that on the effective date of the reorganization,
petitioners received a conditional promise to transfer additional shares that, in effect, consti-
tuted an evidence of indebtedness.
53. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
54. 570 F.2d at 34.
55. Id. The policy behind § 483 is to prevent the conversion of interest into capital gain
in the course of sales of capital assets. The court recognized a potential for a similar conver-
sion in reorganizations employing contingency provisions. Id.; see note 20 supra and accompa-
nying text.
56. The court did not state what constituted "other ownership rights," nor did it ex-
pressly equate foregone dividends and "other ownership rights" to interest. Moreover, the
court did not explain how petitioners' receiving additional shares to compensate them for
foregoing dividends and "other ownership rights" created a potential for abuse, but it did
indicate that dividends and "other ownership rights" are the elements present in a reorgani-
zation which create a potential for abuse. Id. For an analysis of how receiving additional
shares may compensate for these elements, see note 72 infra and accompanying text.
57. 570 F.2d at 34. The court also rejected an argument based on Carlberg for rea-
sons similar to those cited by the Jeffers court. Id. at 34-36; see note 42 supra and accom-
panying text.
58. 570 F.2d at 36.
59. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
60. 570 F.2d at 36.
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interest is not "gain,"6 the court concluded that the imputation of
interest under section 483 does not conflict with section 354.62 Fur-
thermore, the court rejected petitioners' broader argument that the
imputation of interest under section 483 conflicts with the Code's
general purpose to extend the benefits of nonrecognition treatment
to reorganizations utilizing contingency provisions. The court found
that the purpose of nonrecognition treatment is to defer recognition
of gain when taxpayers merely adjust the corporate structure of
their property while maintaining a continuing interest therein. 3 On
the other hand, the court asserted that the purpose of section 483 is
to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain."
Treating a portion of the additional shares as interest and taxing it
as such therefore was not inconsistent with the tax-free treatment
of the portion received by taxpayers "in exchange" for their stock
in the acquired corporation.5 Finding no conflict between section
483 and the Code provisions applicable to reorganizations, the court
held that section 483 applied to the transaction in question.
IV. COMMENT
The instant opinion provides an analysis that may be helpful
to taxpayers who wish to avoid the application of section 483 to their
reorganization plans. Previous revenue rulings,66 regulations," and
61. Id. The court found that gain, as defined by § 1001(a), does not include interest
income; therefore the recognition of interest income is not inconsistent with the nonrecogni-
tion of gain in a reorganization. Id.
62. Id. Petitioners also contended that applying § 483 would conflict with § 1223.
Section 1223 provides that when property is "received in exchange" and its basis is deter-
mined by the property that was given for it, the holding period of the property received
includes the holding period of the property given. Petitioners argued that treating the shares
transferred under the contingency provision as being received on the ultimate transfer date
would conflict with § 1223. The court rejected this argument by stating that § 1223 need not
be applied for all purposes of the Code, but only for the purpose of sections that require a
determination of holding period, and then only to shares "received in exchange." Thus the
court held that the shares received as principal, though they were to have a holding period
based on the shares exchanged for them, could be regarded as being received as payment on
the transfer date. With respect to the shares that constituted interest, the court found no
conflict with § 1223 because they were not "received in exchange" and therefore were not
covered by § 1223. Id. at 36-37.
63. Id. at 37.
64. Id. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
65. 570 F.2d at 37. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument based on Fox,
noting that Fox was based solely on a finding of conflict between § 483 and the specific pro-
visions of § 71. Id. at 38; see note 37 supra and accompanying text. The court found no such
conflict between § 483 and the Code provisions applicable to the case at bar.
66. See notes 34 & 35 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
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case law had declared section 483 applicable to reorganizations, a
fact routinely noted in numerous texts."' The instant court, consis-
tent with authority, held section 483 applicable to the reorganiza-
tion in question, yet the court's analysis went beyond existing pre-
cedent by identifying the elements in reorganizations that create the
potential for abuse 9 frequently cited as a justification for the appli-
cation of section 483.70 The case also indicated the requirements that
taxpayers must meet in order to prevent the transfer of additional
shares under a contingency agreement from constituting a
"payment" under section 483.71 The court suggested that the poten-
tial for abuse present in reorganizations employing contingency pro-
visions is similar to that present in the sale of a capital asset, anal-
ogizing the dividends and "other ownership rights" foregone by tax-
payers to interest in the sale of a capital asset.7 2 By identifying,
68. See, e.g., B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 14-144 (1971).
69. 570 F.2d at 34.
70. See notes 41 & 45 supra and accompanying text.
71. 570 F.2d at 34.
72. As previously noted, see note 20 supra and accompanying text, Congress enacted §
483 in response to the concern that interest could be converted into capital gain in the sale
of capital assets. If, in the sale of a capital asset, the seller demands a higher price to account
for interest, the interest so accounted for is converted into capital gain. This results in the
conversion of an item, interest, which is taxed as ordinary income, into capital gain, which
is taxed at a more favorable rate. Therefore, when a contract for the sale of a capital asset
under which the payments are deferred does not provide for interest, a potential for
abuse-the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain-exists.
The instant court found that in reorganizations using contingency provisions, the share-
holders of the acquired corporation could demand additional shares in return for foregoing,
during the contingency period, dividends and "other ownership rights" incident to the shares
ultimately received. Since § 354 provides that no gain is recognized on the receipt of stock in
the acquiring corporation in exchange for stock of the acquired corporation, without the
application of § 483 or an analagous provision, the parties to a reorganization would be able
to convert the shares received as "compensation" for foregoing dividends and other ownership
rights into shares "received in exchange." Treating such shares as "received in exchange"
would reduce the per-share basis in all the shares received in the reorganization, and capital
gain ultimately would be recognized if and when the shares so received were sold.
Since shares "received in exchange" are ultimately taxed as capital gain, to determine
if the conversion of shares received as "compensation" into shares "received in exchange"
results in the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, it is necessary to determine at
what rate compensation for dividends and "other ownership rights" should be taxed. Divi-
dends are taxed as ordinary income. Therefore, compensation for foregoing dividends also
should be taxed as ordinary income. The instant court did not define what "other ownership
rights" includes, but probably the right to sell the shares and the right to vote the shares are
the most important. Regardless of the exact make-up of "other ownership rights," taxpayers
in essence are assigning these rights for the duration of the contingency period for a fee.
Because such fees fall under no exclusion of the Internal Revenue Code, they would be
included in gross income under § 61 and would be taxed as ordinary income. Thus, the
conversion, by means of a reorganization transaction, of shares received as "compensation"
into shares "received in exchange" would result in the conversion of ordinary income into
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albeit sketchily, the elements in reorganizations that are analogous
to interest in the sale of capital assets, the court provided a target
of trouble spots at which taxpayers can aim their efforts in structur-
ing reorganizations. For example, taxpayers could structure a plan
of reorganization so that the transfer of additional shares under a
contingency provision would include the transfer of any dividends
that would have accrued to those shares during the contingency
period.13 Accounting for other ownership rights, however, is not so
easy. The court did not expressly identify these ownership rights,74
but taxpayers could account for them by providing that any transfer
of additional shares would include a set per-share amount to com-
pensate taxpayers for foregoing all rights other than dividends dur-
ing the contingency period.75 Thus taxpayers, by accounting for the
interest analogues, may eliminate the potential for abuse the in-
stant court used to justify the application of section 483. 71 Since no
statutory authority supports this approach, however, the result is
far from certain.
In analyzing the "payment" issue, the court determined that
capital gain. Consequently, when a reorganization plan provides for no "interest" on addi-
tonal shares transferred under a contingency provision, the same kind of potential for abuse,
the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, as is present in the sale of a capital asset
is present in a reorganization. Moreover, dividends and "other ownership rights" play the role
in reorganizations that interest plays in the sale of a capital asset.
73. By providing for the inclusion of dividends in the ultimate transfer, taxpayer would
realize income to the extent of the dividends, which would be taxed as ordinary income. If,
however, the dividends combined with the compensation for "other ownership rights" are less
than the minimum interest required by § 483, a saving to the taxpayer could result. But see
note 76 infra.
74. See notes 56 & 72 supra.
75. As previously noted, see note 72 supra, the court did not define what constituted
"other ownership rights," but if taxpayers make a good faith effort to provide compensation
for these rights in their plan of reorganization, the court likely will find that the "other
ownership rights" element of the interest analogue was adequately provided for.
76. In addition, § 483 requires as a prerequisite to the imputation of.interest the finding
that an inadequate rate of interest has been provided for in the contract. I.R.C. § 483(c).
Specifically, it requires that a statutory fixed rate of interest set by the Secretary be imputed
if a minimum fixed rate, also set by the Secretary, is not provided for in the contract. If the
rate of "interest" calculated by accounting for the interest analogues meets or exceeds the
minimum fixed rate, a court likely would find that imputation of the statutory fixed rate was
not required. If, however, by providing for "interest" in this manner the rate so calculated
was less than the minimum fixed rate, it is less likely that the court would find that imputa-
tion of the statutory rate was not required. Unless the court found that eliminating the
potential for abuse was sufficient to prevent the application of § 483, or found that notwith-
standing the taxpayer's failure to provide for the minimum fixed rate adequate "interest"
was provided for, the court would probably find § 483 applicable. Of course, taxpayers could
provide for the minimum fixed rate of interest required by § 483, a rate of 6%, and thereby
prevent the application of the 7% statutory fixed rate, but the use of a predetermined rate
does not comport with the economic reality of a reorganization.
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no payment occurred on the effective date of reorganization because
on that date petitioners received few rights in the shares ultimately
transferred. While neither expressly ruling that a transfer of sub-
stantial rights on the effective date of reorganization would result
in a finding that payment occurred on that date nor defining what
constituted a transfer of substantial rights, the court did cite for
comparison Revenue Ruling 70-120.17 Since the court's payment
analysis is compatible with that of the ruling, and since the court
expressly referred to it, taxpayers can be fairly confident in structur-
ing their reorganizations according to the plan outlined therein.78
Although the court provided some guidance by which taxpayers
structuring reorganization plans may avoid the application of sec-
tion 483, the court did not deal satisfactorily with the propriety of
applying section 483 to reorganizations. Undeniably, as the court
found, the wording and legislative history of section 483 are broad
enough to make it applicable to reorganizations. Section 483 was
designed, however, to deal with the conversion of interest into capi-
tal gain in sales of capital assets.79 Accordingly, Congress adopted
the solution of imputing a predetermined rate of interest when no
interest or inadequate interest is provided. This solution comports
with the economic reality of sales contracts when the payments are
made in the form of money." When, however, the payments are not
in cash, but in the form of stock, the imputation of a predetermined
rate of interest is inappropriate. Money is fungible, and a rate of
interest that is appropriate for any money is appropriate for all
money. All stock is not the same, however, and a rate that may be
appropriate for some stock may be totally unrealistic for other
77. 570 F.2d at 34; see note 51 supra and accompanying text. Revenue Ruling 70-120
states that when taxpayers place shares that might ultimately be required to meet the con-
tingency provisions in an escrow account with the shareholders of the acquired corporation
having the right to receive dividends and vote the shares, the shares released from escrow
to such shareholders would not be subject to § 483. See note 35 supra and accompanying
text.
78. Revenue Ruling 70-120 further provides, however, that the shares not needed to
meet the contingency provisions must be retransferred to the acquiring corporation, but does
not state the tax consequences of retransfer. For a treatment of retransfer to the acquiring
corporation, see BrrrKER & EUSMcE, supra note 68, at 14-145.
79. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
80. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940) defined interest as "compensation for the
use or forbearance of money." Id. at 498. The usual method of determining the amount of
compensation for the use of borrowed money is to multiply an interest rate by the amount
borrowed. Section 483(b) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to determine the interest
rate to be imputed under § 483 when the sales contract has provided for an inadequate rate
or no rate of interest. Thus when money payments are involved, the application of § 483
comports with the normal method of calculating the compensation required.
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stock.8' Moreover, taxpayers who attempt to provide a realistic in-
terest rate by basing the compensation on dividends and other own-
ership rights foregone during the contingency period run the risk
that when the stock ultimately is transferred, the rate so provided
will not meet the minimum rate required under section 483, result-
ing in the imputation of the statutory rate. 2 Other taxpayers who
choose to follow the procedure outlined in Revenue Ruling 70-120
also face uncertain results. 3 Thus, although section 483 technically
is broad enough to apply to reorganizations, forcing its application
to transactions it was not designed to cover has left taxpayers with
uncertain and inadequate options for the construction of reorganiza-
tion plans.
JOSEPH W. GIBBS
Torts-Independent Contractors-Employer Is
Liable for Tortious Conduct of His Financially
Irresponsible Independent Contractor
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff construction worker' sued the developer of a shopping
81. When stock involved in a reorganization is yielding high dividends or the ownership
of the stock represents significant control of the acquiring corporation, the amount that
stockholders can demand for foregoing ownership is high. When, however, the stock is paying
low dividends ownership of the shares represents only a nominal percent of control, the
amount that can be demanded for foregoing ownership is correspondingly low. Thus a prede-
termined, uniform rate cannot be appropriate in both cases. Additionally, if the acquiring
corporation pays nontaxable stock dividends, the transferring of additional shares to compen-
sate for foregone dividends does not result in abuse since the receipt of stock dividends causes
the same adjustment to basis and creates the same potential for the recognition of capital
gain as the transfer of additional shares. In such a case, imputing interest at the same rate
required for cash dividend stocks is inappropriate.
82. If taxpayers provide for compensation based on a factor, such as dividends, that
may vary, the taxpayer may find upon ultimate transfer of the shares that the compensation
was insufficient to meet the minimum interest required by § 483. Thus, notwithstanding
efforts to provide for "interest" in accord with the instant court's analysis, taxpayer would
be subject to the provisions of § 483. Conversely, if a taxpayer knows that the dividends
accruing during the contingency period will exceed the rate imputed under § 483, he would
be wise to provide for no compensation and accept the rate prescribed by § 483.
83. As previously noted, the tax consequences on retransfer to the acquiring corporation
of the shares not needed to meet the contingency provisions are not clear. In addition, the
method outlined in the ruling requires that shareholders receive the right to vote and receive
dividends on all shares that are placed in escrow to meet the contingency provision, even
though only a portion thereof might actually be transferred to them. The acquiring corpora-
tion is therefore required to issue and pay dividends on shares it may never transfer, dividends
it may currently need to retain for operational capital.
1. Plaintiff was employed by Wood-Pine Corporation, a paving subcontractor.
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center project 2 to recover damages for injuries caused by the negli-
gence of a subcontractor's employee.3 Stating that denial of his
claim would bar recovery,' plaintiff asserted that defendant was
liable for failure to insist upon a financially responsible independent
contractor.5 Defendant sought summary judgment on the ground
that it could not be held liable for the tort of an independent con-
tractor. Determining that the financial status of an independent
contractor was not a valid consideration for imposition of employer
liability, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted summary judgment for the developer.' On appeal to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed and remanded.
An employer who fails to exercise reasonable care to engage a finan-
cially responsible independent contractor is not immune from liabil-
ity for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor who is
financially incapable of responding to judgments. Becker v. Inter-
state Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
All rules affecting the master-servant relationship derive from
the historic legal principle that employers are liable for the tortious
conduct of their employees occurring in the course of employment.7
Respondeat superior, which imputes employee negligence to the
employer, is not premised on fault. Instead, because the employer
has the right to select, control, and dismiss employees' and because
he is assumed to be in a better financial position to respond to
judgments,9 the employer is held vicariously liable for tortious acts
of his employees within the scope of employment.
2. Defendant I.P. Construction Corporation was the owner and general contractor of the
project.
3. Defendant hired Wood-Pine to pave the shopping center, and Wood-Pine then con-
tracted with Windsor Contracting Corporation to provide trucks and drivers for the paving
job. A driver employed by Windsor injured plaintiff.
4. Windsor's minimal capitalization and automobile liability insurance coverage of only
$10,000 effectively rendered it judgment proof.
5. Although defendant's control over Wood-Pine was sufficient to constitute an
employer-employee relationship, the parties stipulated that Windsor was an independent
contractor.
6. Becker v. Interstate Properties, No. 74-430 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 1976).
7. The roots of the respondeat superior doctrine have been traced to primitive Germanic
legal thought, with its essence emerging in the dicta of Lord Holt in the 1700's. Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1894). See generally W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
8. See, e.g., Elliason v. Western Coal & Coke Co., 162 Minn. 213, 215, 202 N.W. 485,
486 (1925).
9. See, e.g., Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339, 340
(1934).
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One of the earliest cases'" to distinguish an employee from an
independent contractor theorized that the independent contractor
did not serve merely as an extension of the employer, but conducted
its own enterprise with full control over the manner in which the
work was to be done. From this distinction the independent con-
tractor exception to the respondeat superior doctrine developed.'
Because the independent contractor controls prosecution of the en-
terprise and is considered as capable as its employer at avoiding
risks'3 and bearing the costs arising from those risks, 4 the courts
have held it responsible for its own acts and omissions.'5 Conse-
quently, the employer has received immunity from liability for the
tortious conduct of an independent contractor."
The validity of the traditional independent contractor doctrine
has been questioned by a growing tendency to regard the indepen-
dent contractor as a device created by lawyers to provide the em-
ployer with undeserved immunity. 17 The bases of the rule have been
criticized as superficial reactions to a loss already incurred, failing
as common sense attempts to distribute the loss fairly. 8 Several
arguments have been posited to support this criticism. An enter-
prise for which work is performed by an independent contractor
continues as the employer's since he remains the primary party
benefited. He selects the independent contractor and is free to insist
upon one that is competent and financially responsible. If the em-
ployer is held liable on a judgment rendered against the indepen-
10. Bush v. Steinman, 126 Eng. Rep. 978 (K.B. 1799).
11. One commentator, distinguishing between the independent contractor and the
employee, has characterized the former as "the small business man incarnate, the last stub-
born refuge of rugged individualism." Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2
U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 518 (1935).
12. Robbins v. Chicago, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 657 (1867), is the earliest acknowledgment of
the rule by the United States Supreme Court.
13. See Douglas, Vicarious Liaiblity and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 598
(1935).
14. Id. at 599 (concerning equal ability of employer and independent contractor to
obtain liability insurance). See also Morris, supra note 9, at 341, which indicates that inde-
pendent contractors as a class are assumed not to be judgment proof.
15. Morris, supra note 9, at 342-43, suggests that those who have insufficient means to
discharge tort obligations arising during the prosecution of an enterprise should be prevented
from undertaking such an enterprise as an independent contractor.
16. See, e.g., Blake v. Ferris, 5 N.Y. 48, 58 (1851), in which the court stated that holding
an employer responsible for the conduct of a man over which the employer exercises no control
would "push the doctrine of respondeat superior beyond the reason on which it is founded."
See generally PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
17. See Steffen, supra note 11, at 501.
18. See Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent
Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 500 (1935).
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dent contractor, he may demand indemnity from the independent
contractor and also protect himself with insurance. 9 Thus facts and
experience often undermine such practical considerations as risk
prevention and cost of risk bearing,"0 which are argued in support
of the rule.
These criticisms of the status of the independent contractor and
the bases of the rule have created exceptions so numerous and ex-
tensive as to cast doubt upon the validity of the rule. 2' The circum-
stances in which an employer will be held liable for the acts of an
independent contractor typically are divided into four categories:
the employer retains control over the independent contractor;2 2 the
activity engaged in is inherently dangerous;2 3 the independent con-
tractor performs a nondelegable duty of the employer; 24 and the
employer negligently hires an incompetent independent contrac-
tor.21
The last exception, which requires reasonable care in the selec-
tion of a competent independent contractor, historically has con-
templated a contractor possessing the knowledge, skill, experience,
and equipment necessary to perform without creating unreasonable
risks.2 1 Although an employer who intentionally selects a financially
irresponsible independent contractor is liable for that independent
19. Insurance generally is considered a normal cost of doing business. See, e.g.,
PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71, at 468.
20. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. Extensive analysis has been given
to the policies underlying distributive justice, which require placement of liability with the
party best able to prevent enterprise risks and bear the cost of those risks by shifting (through
insurance) and distributing (by passing costs on to the public through increased prices) those
costs. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YAE
L.J. 499 (1961); Douglas, supra note 13.
21. See generally PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, §§ 410-429.
Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 503, 277 N.W. 226, 228
(1937), stated that "the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its
exceptions."
22. See PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71, at 469-70.
23. See PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71, at 472-74; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 427. The
leading case on this exception is Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B. 321 (1876). See also Wallach v. United
States, 291 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1961).
24. See Chapman, Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors, 50 LAW Q.
REV. 71, 75 (1934), which explains the exception as follows: "IfI am under a duty to a person
I am liable if that duty is not performed and damage thereby results, and I cannot evade
that liability by delegating the performance of the duty to an independent contractor." See
also PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71, at 470-72.
25. See Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., 338 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1964). See also PROSSER, supra
note 7, § 71, at 469; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 411. For a discussion of limitations on
employers' liability for injuries to employees caused by incompetent independent contractors,
see Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288, 292-93 (2d Cir. 1966).
26. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 7, § 71, at 469; RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 411,
Comment a.
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contractor's torts,2 no court has explicitly ruled that negligent hir-
ing of an insolvent and uninsured independent contractor consti-
tutes a violation of the employer's selection duty. Courts and com-
mentators, however, have suggested inclusion of financial irrespon-
sibility as an element of incompetence for purposes of the negligent
selection exception, criticizing simple lack of knowledge as an insuf-
ficient justification for employment of a judgment-proof indepen-
dent contractor.28 In 1959 Majestic Realty Associates Inc. v. Toti
Contracting Co.29 stirred considerable interest by suggesting inclu-
sion of financial responsibility under the competence requirement.
Although not basing its holding on this rationale," the New Jersey
Supreme Court indicated that, as between the innocent victim and
the employer, distributive justice' required the employer to bear
the costs of the injury caused by the uninsured independent con-
tractor since he was in a better position to anticipate such costs and
distribute them to the public.2
Several courts have acknowledged the Majestic dictum, but
none has directly supported it. Matanuska Electric Association, Inc.
v. Johnson,33 in which the independent contractor was insolvent and
had failed to procure statutorily required workmen's compensation
insurance, gave extensive consideration to the notion that financial
responsibility is an attribute of incompetence. The lower court de-
cided that financial ability to respond in damages represented an
27. See, e.g., Holbrook, Cabot & Rollins Corp. v. Perkins, 147 F. 166 (1st Cir. 1906);
Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586 (1873).
28. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 9, at 344.
29. 30 N.J. 425, 153 A.2d 321 (1959).
30. The city Parking Authority employed an independent contractor to raze several
buildings. During the demolition, the independent contractor negligently allowed a wall to
fall on an adjacent building, causing extensive damage. Employer Parking Authority's
eriployer-independent contractor immunity was denied because of the inherently dangerous
nature of the work. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
31. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
32. The court stated:
Inevitably the mind turns to the fact that the injured third party is entirely innocent
and that the occasion for his injury arises out of the desire of the contractee to have
certain activities performed. The injured has no control over or relation with the contrac-
tor. The contractee, true, has no control over the doing of the work and in that sense is
also innocent of the wrongdoing; but he does have the power of selection and in the
application of concepts of distributive justice perhaps much can be said for the view that
a loss arising out of the tortious conduct of a financially irresponsible contractor should
fall on the contractee.
30 N.J. at 432-33, 153 A.2d at 324-25.
33. 386 P.2d 698 (Alas. 1963). Matanuska Electric Association hired an independent
contractor to bulldoze a right of way. An employee of the bulldozing contractor was badly
injured by a falling tree dislodged by the bulldozer, and sought recovery against Matanuska
because the independent contractor failed to provide workmen's compensation insurance.
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aspect of competence no less important than skill or experience. On
appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected this holding, reasoning
that the circumstances in that case did not justify an extension of
the rule since more hardships likely would be created than would
be alleviated .3 The court emphasized the unfair burden that a rule
requiring extensive policing of the independent contractor's finan-
cial status and insurance coverage would create for employers .3
Although the court acknowledged that policy reasons eventually
might mandate a rule guaranteeing compensation for victims, it
indicated that the rule should be grounded on a strict liability
theory because of the administrative difficulties inherent in a negli-
gence standard. Establishment of such a rule, the court held, is a
duty of the legislature rather than the courts. 37 In Coleman v. Silver-
berg Plumbing Co., 3 a California court of appeal addressed the
issue whether strict financial responsibility should be applied to the
employer-independent contractor relationship. In the absence of a
bad faith hiring of an insolvent contractor to avoid liability,39 the
court considered the burden on the employer too great to justify
34. Id. at 702. The court explained:
If the rule were extended to include financial responsibility no contractor could be
employed with safety without insurance or a contractor's surety bond to cover the em-
ployer's potential liability in the event the contractor failed to abide by the law and
provide for employee compensation, or if, after procuring insurance, the contractor per-
mitted it to lapse, be cancelled, or lost coverage for any other reason.
Id. at 703. The court then noted that the majority of employers of independent contractors
are salaried workmen and wage earners of modest means; therefore,
No end of justice would appear to be served by a rule which in its largest application,
would have the effect of transferring the hardship of injured workmen to persons of
modest means and business experience who were only remotely connected with the fault
or negligence that caused the injury and who had no control over the performance of the
work by the independent contractor.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The court stated that whether reasonable care was exercised in selection of the
independent contractor depends upon the facts of each particular case, and that the facts
surrounding the contractor's employment and competency are always judged in hindsight
after a serious injury, when the usual sources of compensation are not available and personal
hardship must result. Adding financial responsibility as an element of incompetence would
create further confusion to the rule when there is "little enough certainty . . . as it presently
reads." Id.
37. Id.
38. 263 Cal. App. 2d 74, 69 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1968). Silverberg, a plumbing contractor,
hired independent contractor Stark Company to dig trenches for the placement of the plumb-
ing. Coleman, an employee of Stark Company, was killed while operating a backhoe to dig
the trenches. Coleman's wife sought recovery from Silverberg for negligently hiring an inde-
pendent contractor (Stark Company) who did not procure workmen's compensation insur-
ance.
39. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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imposition of liability. 0
The Majestic theory that selection of a competent contractor
requires more than an evaluation of skill and experience was ap-
proved by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court
in Bennett v. T&F Distributing Co." The court held the employer
liable, however, not because the independent contractor was finan-
cially irresponsible, but because the employer was negligent in hir-
ing an independent contractor with vicious propensities.2 Relying
heavily on Majestic, the court held that distributive justice dictated
extension of the duty of reasonable care in the selection of contrac-
tors for the protection of innocent third parties, despite the investi-
gative burden placed on employers." Although Majestic, Bennett,
and a considerable number of commentators have advocated severe
restrictions on the use of the independent contractor rule,44 no court
has held employers liable for the tortious conduct of independent
contractors that are financially incapable of responding to judg-
ments. 5
40. 263 Cal. App. 2d at 80-82, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63. The court relied heavily on
Matanuska, stressing the burden of policing the contractor and again indicating that creation
of such a rule was within the province of the legislature.
41. 117 N.J. Super. 439, 285 A.2d 59 (1971). A distributor of vacuum cleaners employed
an independent contractor as a door-to-door salesman. In the course of his contact with a
customer, the salesman committed an assault and battery upon her, for which he was given
a seven to ten year sentence. The customer sued the vacuum cleaner distributor to recover
damages resulting from the employer's negligent selection of a vicious salesman.
42. The independent contractor-salesman had an extensive criminal record, including
an F.B.I. arrest record under two separate names. He had been convicted of larceny of
automobiles, assault and battery, malicious mischief, and of being a disorderly person, and
had been arrested and charged with possession of stolen property and assault with a deadly
weapon.
43. 117 N.J. Super. at 445, 285 A.2d at 62.
44. See, e.g., notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text. See also F. HARPER, LAW OF
ToRTs § 292, at 646 (1933) (stating that several factors combine to constitute "such a powerful
argument for the liability of the employer of an independent contractor that it would seem
highly desirable for the courts to adopt the rule of liability and confine nonliability to a few
exceptional cases"); Morris, supra note 9, at 345 (indicating that "while it is usually desirable
that a contractor be ultimately liable for his torts, in general, the contractee should be
responsible to third persons").
45. In one of the few federal court cases considering the issue, Reid v. United States,
421 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1976), the court dismissed on other grounds without comment
on the negligent selection issue. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 411, Comment g, indicates
the prevailing attitude of the courts:
Cases are lacking in sufficient number to deal with the question of whether the employer
may ever be responsible to any third person for his failure to exercise care to employ a
contractor who is financially responsible, and therefore able to respond, by liability
insurance or otherwise, for any damages which he may inflict by his tortious conduct.
The Institute expresses no opinion that there is, or that there is not, any obligation upon
the employer.
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Ill. THE INSTANT OPINION
In attempting to anticipate the course a New Jersey court
would adopt in similar circumstances, the instant federal court un-
dertook to interpret Majestic and reconcile its dictum" with New
Jersey's traditional adherence to the independent contractor rule.47
The court declined to apply mechanically the existing master-
servant rules and their exceptions, but proposed instead to resolve
the conflict by implementing the goals of New Jersey tort law." The
court thereby avoided the possible conclusion that the independent
contractor alone could be held liable for the tort, a conclusion that
effectively would have denied the victim compensation.
Extracting these tort laws goals from the distributive justice
concepts propounded in Majestic," the court identified three spe-
cific policies of New Jersey tort law that would be served by adopt-
ing Majestic. The court first acknowledged the need to place the
burden of compensating negligent injury on the party best able to
bear and distribute the loss.5 0 The court found that when an em-
ployer is stable and profitable, carries substantial liability insur-
ance, and is in a position facilitating the distribution of his own
increased costs to the public, he is the proper party to absorb the
loss.-' As a second goal, the court recognized the desire to allocate
liability to the party best able to control the factors producing a
plaintiff's loss.2 The court noted that the negligence causing the
actual injury, typically the sole factor giving rise to a loss, consti-
tuted only one element of the loss-producing conduct in this case;
defendant's failure to assure financial responsibility to compensate
46. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
47. The district court's jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Majestic was
the only New Jersey case dealing with the financial irresponsibility issue. See notes 29-32
supra and accompanying text.
48. Matanuska and Coleman, the two most significant cases rejecting the Majestic
dictum in favor of traditional independent contractor rule theory, were distinguished. The
Coleman decision was considered inapplicable because it attempted to base employer respon-
sibility on strict liability grounds. Matanuska, while considering negligence as the possible
basis for employer liability, was rejected on two grounds: first, because of the faulty presump-
tion that such a liability rule would apply to all independent contractor situations, and
second, because the plaintiff in Matanuska was an employee of the independent contractor,
and thus had an opportunity to evaluate the contractor himself.
49. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. The court indicated that these policy
considerations serve only to undergird the Majestic dictum, and the holding of the instant
case, and that the financial irresponsibility-as-incompetence exception was intended to be
instituted. 569 F.2d at 1213.
50. 569 F.2d at 1209. For a discussion of the justifications for shifting the burden to the
party best able to bear and distribute the loss, see Calabresi, supra note 20, at 517-28.
51. 569 F.2d at 1210.
52. Id. at 1211.
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for that injury combined with the negligence to produce plaintiffs
loss. 3 Although neither party exercised control over the indepen-
dent contractor's negligent conduct, the court concluded that the
employer was in a better position to ascertain whether the indepen-
dent contractor was insured sufficiently." Finally, the opinion iden-
tified the placing of the costs of accidents on those benefiting from
the activities producing the accidents as a third policy relevant to
the instant case.5 5 The court argued that employers receive un-
deserved advantages by hiring uninsured contractors; the inde-
pendent contractor's reduced costs enable the employer to operate
with less expense, while nonetheless retaining the immunity con-
ferred by the independent contractor rule. The court reasoned that
placing liability with the party benefited was an effective means of
eliminating these advantages. Thus, when the employer has supe-
rior ability to bear and distribute loss and to control the factors
producing loss, and is the party primarily benefited by the activity
engendering the loss, the court suggested that the employer might
be the proper party to sustain that loss.57
IV. COMMENT
Although presenting convincing and worthy policy arguments
for shifting the burden of loss from the victim to the employer, the
instant court failed to clarify the rule suggested in Majestic and
adopted here that financial irresponsibility is an aspect of incom-
petence for purposes of the independent contractor rule exception.
Following suggestions made by the Majestic case and by numerous
commentators, 8 the holding statement expands the exception to the
independent contractor rule denying employers immunity for negli-
gent selection of an independent contractor. 9 The subsequent ra-
tionale, however, based on the goals of tort law, °6 confuses the na-
53. Id. Morris, Agency and Partnership, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 375, 379 (1960), indicates
that assigning liability because of this failure to assure compensation should serve as an
incentive to procure the necessary insurance.
54. 569 F.2d at 1211.
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id.
57. In his dissent, Judge Hunter argued that the majority had predicted inaccurately
what the state court would have decided in these circumstances, pointing out that no other
court in the country had yet broken from the traditional independent contractor rule. Specifi-
cally, the inexactitude of the standard for imposing liability on the employer was criticized
in that it limited the scope of duty to include only those whose financial capabilities and
business acumen are more than "modest."
58. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 9.
59. 569 F.2d at 1209.
60. Id. at 1209-12.
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ture and extent of the employer's new duty. The rationale indicates
an attempt to provide equitable, distributive justice based on cri-
teria that in many instances are unrelated to negligence. For exam-
ple, the ability to bear and distribute loss and the receipt of benefits
from an activity producing loss, which provided the key support for
the instant court's holding,6' have little bearing on the issue of negli-
gence in selection of the independent contractor responsible for the
loss. The placement of the cost burden based on such policy is
tantamount to strict liability for financially stable employers, argu-
ably permitting a conclusion that whenever the independent con-
tractor cannot fully compensate the injured party, its employer is
negligent and thus liable for failing to hire an adequately insured
independent contractor.
Even the numerous critics 2 of the independent contractor rule,
however, do not suggest such a drastic modification.63 The rule is
justified by the numerous circumstances in which the employer has
used reasonable care in selecting the independent contractor, or in
which the employer could not be expected to inquire into the inde-
pendent contractor's financial status. 4 The Majestic case and those
that suggest placing responsibility upon the employer to assure a
solvent or insured contractor cannot be interpreted as imposing
upon the employer absolute responsibility for the financial status of
the independent contractor. Rather, an attempt is being made to
reduce the number of uncompensated accident victims by placing
a duty on certain employers to exercise care in the selection of
financially responsible independent contractors.
The confusion created by the instant court's extensive use of
policy arguments to support the imposition of a new duty upon
employers in the selection of independent contractors requires clari-
fication to prevent future misinterpretation of the duty. Distribu-
tive justice concepts 5 do not define the employer's duty. Instead,
these policy arguments are useful guidelines for determining when
the duty exists. Furthermore, the mere existence of an uncompen-
sated victim and an employer who is economically stable, able to
distribute losses to the public, and in a position to ascertain the
financial status of the independent contractor-tortfeasor does not
61. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., note 44 supra and accompanying text.
64. E.g., Steffen, supra note 11, at 518, suggests the number of roles an independent
contractor may serve: "he paints your house, repairs your automobile, washes your windows,
handles your collections, sells your real estate, procures your divorce and so on ad infinitum."
65. See note 20 and notes 50-57 supra and accompanying text.
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automatically dictate placement of liability on that employer. For
example, a construction company may be required to exercise rea-
sonable care to select financially responsible independent contrac-
tors, because of its unique supervisory relationship to its indepen-
dent contractors. In contrast, if an individual jumps into a taxicab
that subsequently runs over a third party, the passenger probably
will not be held liable merely because the taxicab driver is insolvent
and uninsured. Despite the existence of an employer-independent
contractor relationship, distributive justice concepts simply do not
require that a duty be imposed on passengers to inquire into the
financial status of taxicab drivers. Thus the initial inquiry when a
financially irresponsible independent contractor has injured a third
party is whether the employer had a duty to inquire into that inde-
pendent contractor's financial status. The distributive justice con-
cepts propounded by the instant court should provide guidance in
making that determination. Also beneficial is a consideration
whether the third party could be expected to look to the employer
for recovery, and whether the employer hired the independent con-
tractor to assist in a profit-seeking activity rather than simply to
perform a service." These inquiries, though not an exhaustive list
of probative factors, will assist in distinguishing between employers
who do and those who do not have a duty to scrutinize the financial
responsibility of their independent contractors.
Existence of the duty, however, does not automatically dictate
liability. The duty placed upon the employer is one of reasonable
care, compliance with which is a question of fact. Whether the em-
ployer can satisfy his duty by contractually requiring minimum
capitalization or insurance coverage, or whether the employer must
police his independent contractors to ensure financial responsibility
not only at the time of the contract but also throughout its duration
depends upon the surrounding circumstances." Thus the tort victim
of a financially irresponsible independent contractor must first
prove that considerations such as the distributive justice concepts
enunciated in Majestic and in the instant case require the employer
to exercise reasonable care in selection of a solvent and insured
66. See note 64 supra. While equitable considerations would require a general contrac-
tor to be liable for the tortious conduct of his insolvent subcontractor, those same considera-
tions do not apply to the individual who hires another to pave his driveway or paint his house,
despite the existence of an employer-independent contractor relationship.
67. For example, one who hires an independent contractor who was previously adjudi-
cated a bankrupt runs a greater risk of being held liable than one who deals with a reputable
and financially stable independent contractor.
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independent contractor. Second, the victim must demonstrate that
the duty was not met if he is to recover from the employer.
The independent contractor rule has been acknowledged as a
common sense attempt to distribute losses fairly." The instant court
recognized that in certain circumstances, granting an employer
immunity from responsibility for the tortious conduct of his insol-
vent independent contractor simply is not sensible when it requires
that a tort victim go uncompensated for his injuries. It thus pro-
posed to alter the rule to accommodate those circumstances. This
new exception should be interpreted with common sense as placing
a duty of reasonable care only on certain employers who, because
of their relationship to the independent contractor and their ability
to bear and distribute losses, may properly be expected to exercise
such care.
WILLIAM ARTHUR HOLBY
68. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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